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INTRODUCTION 
A. Purpose of Thesis. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of the ~age 
stabilization program administered under the Defense Production Act of 1~501 
and for purposes of a contrasting analysis consider in part the administrative 
and policy problems under the DPA of 19502 in relation to similar proble~s 
•' 
which developed under the wage stabilization program during World War II• 
I 
It appears reasonable to me that the effectiveness of a wage stabiliza-
tion program can be evaluated by an analysis of the administrative and p6licy 
I problems which the program must face and settle as well as by a factual I: 
analysis 9~ the various indicia which indicate whether or not such a program· 
was effective. For purposes of this paper I prefer to look directly into the 
program itself and determine from available data, published, unpublished 1or blf-
personal interviews, whether these economic problems were solved effectiv;ely 
I 
and in so doing evaluate how closely the program did conform to the policy 
I 
established by the enacting Congress. 
A further purpose of this paper is to consider briefly the effect of:, the . 
national controls regulating wages upon the long established right of labor to 
[, 
collectively bargain for its wage. The sharp contrast between the attitude of 
labor and management during the years of World War II and the attitude du1ing 
,I 
the years of the Korean Conflict points up the difficulty and makes paramount 
the question of whether or not the basic root of controls must be voluntary. 
In this respect a brief consideration of the administrative and policy co*-
flicts between the wage stabili-zation program and the longstanding labor ,, 
1. 64 Stat. 798 (1950); 50 USC 2061 (Supp. 1952). 
2. Defense Production Act of 1950, hereinafter referred to as DPA of 195q. 
i 
legislation is required. Ultimately it is the courts which decide which is 
I 
the immovable object or the irresistible force and therefore determine , 
w·hether it is the stabilization program or the traditional rights of labor 
which shall be suspended to make way for the other. 
B . Methods Used. 
The methods of research used in the preparation of this paper were divided 
OR about an equal time basis between the general economic and legal inveptiga-
tion which contributed to Chapters I, II, III and IV, and the specialized 
economic analysis which makes up the more detailed review of the New England 
' I 
WSB in 1Chapter V. In the investigation of the general economic and legal pro-
blems as set forth in Chapters I, II, and III the library sources were con-
sulted as well as specialized professional publications and numerous public 
documents of limited edition. In the investigation of the New England WSB 
which forms the entire Chapter IV, personal interviews with key personne~ of 
the Board proved to be the only available source of information. 
While I recognize that the New England Board cannot be said to be truly 
representative of all regional Boards, the selection of the New England Wage 
Stabilization Board was made because of the availability of the personneL of 
the New England WSB for personal interviews. The analysis of the operati9n of 
one of the regional boards would also indicate the effectiveness of policy 
I 
coordination between the parochial and national units of the WSB and pro~de 
information about the policy and administration of the National Board. Much 
,, 
of the material collected by the New England WSB which would be of benefit to 
I 
economists remains confidential and consequently an exhaustive report is ~ot 
I 
possible in this paper. The Boston office of the New England WSB was ver-y: 
cooperative and arranged several personal interviews with this writer. In the 
discussions of the New England WSB it is impossible to give a chronologic~l 
ii 
report of the regional a?tivities of the Board and accordingly a sample of the 
activities of the staff and board members is recorded. The operation of the 
I' 
regional boards and the National WSB has been reviewed by a selective analysis 
II 
of one regional boardJ the New England WSB. The reader will be able td. 
understand the operation of the national and regional segments of the WSB by a 
II 
comprehensive analysis of one regional board and its relationship to the 
national board. The problems of the regional boards, while differing in kind, 
location and magnitude, require a similar rationale by the regional boards 
I 
which·must be based on the policy established by the stabilization prog~am. 
iii 
I. History and Basis of Wage Stabilization 
A. General Background of Stabilization 
In total or semi wars, the military requires additional raw materi~s, 
food plant, equipment and manpower. In modern v1ars, they may require a1:1 much 
as 50% oi the national output.1 The cost of the war can be met by taxe~, 
borrowing and/or printing money. The real cause of inflation lies in th~ 
failure of government to meet these costs out of current taxes, with the con-
2 
sequent increase in money supply. The manner in which armament inflation 
develops is: 1) the total amount of money spent by the government, indiyiduals 
and businesses greatly exceeds the total of available consumer goods; 2)1the 
total amount of goods and services for consumer consumption declines to fre~ 
facilities, manpower and materials for defense production; 3) an enormous 
government demand suddenly on materials of war production.3 II These added dollars 
to the consumer incomes compete for the limited supply of consumer goods and 
services. Here then is the essence of inflation--too many dollars bidding for 
too few goods. The result of this is a tendency to bid up prices and wages in 
a spiraling fashion. If prices are not halted, there wou+d be many adver,se 
effects on the defense economy: 1) the increase in the money cost of ~he war; 
I 
2) deterioration of civilian morale release of an undue burden on those least 
able to bear it--those with lower incomes cannot protect themselves as·~an 
business interests. 3) disruptions in production because of the increase in 
hoarding and speculation; 4) plus the postwar problem~ when prices recede
1
:_4_ 
These harmful effects of inflationary pressures make necessary the centro+ of 
.# 
inflation. This control of inflation in a mobilized economy is called 
1. Harris, Seymour, Economics of Mobilization, p. 3· 
2. Backman, Jules, War and Defense Economics, pp. 214-216. 
3. Chandler and Wallace, Economic Mobilization and Stabilization, p. 34. 
4. Baclcman, op. cit., P· 23 
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economic stabilization. The program designed to limit inflation must deal 
first with the causes, the increase in money supply and the expansion oft 
credit, not with the results, price rises and wage rises.5 
The indirect method is control by strong fiscal and monetary policy,. The 
purpose of the fiscal and monetary policy "Yrould be to control total spending 
for output and labor. The nation should have a vigorous tax policy to cut 
into current disposable inc9me and through restrictive monetary policies ~o 
limit the supply of credit and money. Encouraging a saving policy may also 
help halt inflation~y tendencies during the emergency. However an increase 
in saving is potential purchasing power which i-TOuld be spent as soon as the 
defense period is over. Therefore the problem is postponed to a later date. 
The direct method of limiting the rise of the general price and wage 
level is control by direct controls. These methods put a "ceiling" on wages 
and prices. These direct controls cannot prevent inflationary pressures 
unless monetary and fiscal policies are sufficiently restrictive but they do 
prevent an explosive wage and price spiral. In the first part of the arma,-
,, 
ment program relatively few of the direct controls may be required; however, 
at the peak of an all-out war effort both the direct and indirect methods 
6 
would be utilized. 
Highly complex interrelationships characterize our economy and therefore 
the imposition of one control frequently leads to another. Such is the case 
5. To make controls effective it is necessary to eliminate, modify or offs~t 
the causes. To the extent that this cannot be done, prices will rise and 
likewise wages. To prevent a rapid and excessive price rise and to ditect 
the flow of resources to the war effuse, the more direct or specific con-
trols must be used. In controlling the results first price rise, wage rise, 
the source of problem is not corrected and the problem is merely postponed 
to a later date when the controls are elimated. 
6. Chandler and Wallace, op. cit. pp. 40-50. 
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when price controls are set, then wage controls and manpower controls are 
necessary. It is with the wage control phase of the stabilization program 
that I am concerned. Stabilized wages do not mean wages are frozen but 
merely limitations are placed on increases in wage rates. 
B. During World War II. 
Early efforts at stabilization by the Federal Government were initiated 
during the 1930's7 but it was not till the war in Europe commenced in 1939 
and our economy slmrly began to recover from the financial depths of the 30's 
that a wage program of stabilization was enacted. The large supply of udem-
played labor from the .depression era together with the slo1v.ness of the early 
defense program presented a gradual change in the economic picture and t~ere-
flare did not at the outset require immediate control. 
Several months before December 7, 19~1, the economy of the nation was 
undergoing some inflationary pressure and on July 30, 1941 the President sent 
a message to Congress requesting the enactment of certain legislation, for 
the control of prices.8 Out of this request came a bill embodying legislation 
I 
as requested by the President which was referred to the Committee on Banking 
and Currency.9 After hearings an amended bill was reported out of Committee10 
and subsequently passed by the Congress as the Emergency Price Control Act of 
1942.11 
7. Efforts to stabilize the economy were taken by the Government and such 
attempts were manifested in the Cotton Stabilization Corporation, org~nized 
under the laws of Delaware in June 1930, dissolved on December 27, 1934;. in 
the Federal Emploj1lllent Stabilization Board, 46 S·tat. 1085 (1931), 
abolished June 10, 1933; and in the Federal Employment Stabilization 
Office, established March 1, 1934, abolished July 1, 1939· 
8. For background information on the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,, see 
House Committee on Banking and Currency's Report No. 1409, 77th Cong.~~-lst 
session (1941), report dated Nov. 7, 1941. 
9· H.R. 6479, 77th Cong.--lst session (1941). 
10. H.R. 5990, 77th Cong.--lst session (1941). 
11. 56 Stat. 23, 77th Cong.--2nd session (1942). (Public Law 421)--approved--
Jan. 30, 1942. 
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I 
In the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 there was no provision ~pr 
wage stabilization; however, o?e of the purp~ses, inter alia, of the act was, 
"to protect persons with relatively fixed and limited income, consumers, wage 
earners, investors and persons dependent on life insurance, annuities and 1 pen-
sions, from undue impairment of their standard of livin,g. 11 12 
Before the end of the year, however, the public pressure on Congress 
to complete the sphere of economic stabilization brought about a joint co~-
ference between the Senate and the House to send to the President a bill for 
wage control. Such a bill was passed by both Houses of Congress and upon "the 
I· 
I 
signature of the President became Fublic Law 729 of the 77th Congress--an act 
establishing price and wage controls.13 This act, like the Emergency Price 
Control Act of 1942, was passed by Congress un<;ler the constitutional authority 
of the general war pmrers and gave to the President authority to promulgate 
such regulations as he considered would be necessary. The wage and price level 
was established as of September 15, 1942 and directed the President'to isspe a 
' 
general order 11 ••• stabilizing pr~ces, wages and salaries, affecting the cos~ of 
living •.. " on or before November 1, 1942. The administrative rules and regu-
lations were issued-on October 27, 1942 establish~dg authority in the National 
War Labor Board.14 Special authority vTas also given to the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue and to the Secretary of Agriculture 15 -by vThich the respective 
departments could refuse to recognize for cost or expense purposes moneys·paid 
I 
in violation of the Emergency Price Contrpl Act of 1942, when claimed undet the 
12. 56 Stat. 23 at p. 2--50 USC 901 (1946). 
13. 56 Stat. 765, 77th Cong.--2nd session (1942). Approved Oct. 2, 1942. 
14. Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter XVIII, part 4001. 
15. Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations, see 4001.4 and 4001.5a. 
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laws of the United States. 
The precursor of all wage control boards was the National Defense Media-
16 
tion Board, which was established to settle labor disputes threatening to 
~ obstruct the production or transportation of equipment or materials essen-
tial to national defense. After the declaration of war on Japan, Germany 
0 
and Italy, the President by Executive Order 9017 of January 12, 1942, 
established the National War Labor Board, and this Board assumed the duties 
of the Mediation Board ivhich was terminated by the same order. The Nati,enal 
War Labor Board was actively functioning when the October 2, 1942 amendment 
to the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 was passed which directed the 
President to issue regul~tions stabilizing wages and prices. The author~ty 
of the N.W.L.B. l7 was delegated to·the Board by regulations approved on' 
'I 
October 27, 1942 18 following Executive Order No. 9250 of October 3, 1942, 
which set out the wage and salary stabilization policy. Title II Section 1 
of Executive Order 9250 reads: 
"No increase in wage rates, granted as a result of voluntary agreement, 
collective bargaining, conciliation, arbitration, ·or otherwise, and 1'no 
decreases in wage rates, shall be authorized unless notice of such 
increases or decreases shall have been filed with the National War Labor 
Board, and unless the National War Labor Board has approved such 
increases or decreases •..• " 
With this criterion the N.W.L.B. on its own authority issued general! 
orders 19 further implementing the wage and salary stabilization policy dnd 
I 
, • I 
the Board created in the Office for Emergency Manageme~t and composed of 
16. Established by Executive Order 8716 of March 19, 1941. 
17. Authority also given for certain purposes to the Secretary of AgricULture 
and the Commissioner of Interna~ Revenue/bY Title 32, Code of FederaL 
Regulations, Chapter XVIII, part 4001, approved Oct. 27, 1942. !' 
18. Title 32, C.F.R., Chapter XVIII, part 4001.2. 
19. Title 29, C.F.R., Chapter VI, part 803, filed Oct. 16, 1942. 
-5· 
twelve special commissioners appointed by the Presi~ent began to actively 
effectuate the national stabilization policy. 20 The Board thus functioned 
' 
during the war years and was subsequently transferred to the Department of 
21 
Labor) where it continued to administer until final termination on 
December 31, 1945 by Executive Order 9672. This order established a sue-
' 
cesser agency, the National Wage Stabilization Board, 22 whose function was 
the stabilization of wages and salaries and settlement of certain labor dis-
putes. I It was rather smort-lived and was terminated effective February 24, 
1947 by Executive Order 9809 of December 12, 1946. 23 With the transfer of 
the functions of the National Wage Stabilizatipn Board to the Secretary of 
rl Labor and Department of the Treasury, there ended the phase of wage control 
. 
growing out of World War II. 
C. During the Korean Conflict. 
Following the end of hostilities with Japan in August of 1945 the busi-
ness of the country took on renewed strength and a wave of economic pros~ 
perity engulfed the nation. Production of consumer goods reached an allftime 
high, but not of total production, 24 and the labor force reached a point of 
20, Executive Order No. 9250 of October 3, 1942 which empowered the Board to 
act as final arbiter of wartime labor disputes and to control adjust-
ments of wages and salaries under $5,000 a year with certain except~ons. 
21. Executive Order 9617 of September l9, 1945 . 
22. The Wage Adjustment Board, created May 29, 1942 by the Secretary of Labor 
by direction of the President on May 14, 1942 continued to function talong 
1-Tith the N.W.S.B. but was exclusively concerned with wages in the con-
struction and building industry. 
23. The Wage Adjustment Board was disbanded upon the termination of the 
N.W.S.B., and because its function and policies were of smaller impqr-
tance than the N.W.S.B., consideration of the work of the W.A.B. cannot 
be undertaken here. 1 
24. Total Industrial Production declined after August 1945, because of cut• 
backs in armament production. Directly affected were the durable manu-
facturers. A sharp decline in production of machinery and transportation 
equipment occured. Indirectly, the cutbacks caused a reduction in ;the 
production of iron, steel and other metal industries. 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, Sept. 1251, p. 2. 
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full employment. Such was the economic status of the country when Korea 
demanded that we produce goods for war. The economic expansion of the coun-
try from the end of World War II to the outbreak of the Korean vlar was *ot 
without fluctuations. In 1945-1946 the nation experienced a mild recession 
I 
due to the cutback of munitions production. The cutback in munitions pro-
' 
duction resulted in a decline in government expenditures and only 40~ off the 
. 
reduction in government spending was offset by in~reases in consumer exPendi-
tures and in investment during these years. The years from the last quarter 
of 1946 to 1948 were marked by high prosperity. In 1948 a forewarning of a 
change in the economy appeared. Some of the demand of the war years was! 
satisfied and in the last quarter of 1948, prices began to decline . With a 
rapid expansion in supplies of commodities, with a reduct'ion in available 
credit and in the purchasing power of available funds, with the satisfac~ion 
@Utained for the most urgent demand of the war years, the prices began to 
soften. 
Following the price decline reduction in inventory investment occure~. 
I 
These factors were ~esponsible for the recession of 1948-1949. This recession 
hit a bottom point in July 1949 when industrial production reached a sha~ 
,, 
trough; from this lmr point the economy started with renewed vigor and rose 
rapidly. The recession of 1948-1949 was soon at an end, and the level of 
the 1948 peak was attained in May 1950. Inventory investment rose almos~ as 
much from the fourth quarter of 1949 to the second quarter of 1950 as it 'had 
fallen in the recession. Commodity prices began to rise again in the fir,st 
quarter of 1949 but this rise was gradual until the second half of 1950. In 
h d . 25. the spring of 1950 the economy once again ivas on t e upwar svnng. The 
President recognized the need for immediate economic control. The President's 
25. Bratt, Elmer, Business Cycles and Forecasting, pp. 340-354. 
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I 
call to Congress for assistanc~ to maintain a stabilized economy follow~ng 
the outbreak of hostilities in KOrea was given in his message to Congress on 
July 19, 1950 and in his mid-year 1950 Economic Report, the President asked 
,, 
for special powers under the general constitutional grant of power to the 
,, 
President to provide for the common defense, and out of this request bills 
I 
were introduced in both the House and Senate.26 The request by the President 
,, 
was for an increase in the defense strength of the nation and provision for 
military power to deal with the aggression in Korea; and accordingly a com-
prehensi ve plan for economic ex:pansio? under a stabilized economy was the 
goal he established for Congress. Both Houses in conference considered the 
Senate and House bills and the Conference27 favorably reported on the House 
bill as amended. This bill was subsequently passed as Public Law 774 anal 
entitled the Defense Production Act of 1950.28 
I 
The orderly legislative history of wage stabilization during the KOrean 
Conflict, as evidenced by the considerations of the House and Senate Com-1 
mittees and their desire to enact a single unified coordinated piece of 
legislation, reflects the recent experience of the Congress with regulations 
during World War Ir.29 The Defense Production Act of 1950 was the primary 
authority for wage and salary stabilization and price control. Out of this 
legislation the Wage Stabilization Board {W.S.B.) was created.3° The Wag~ 
I 
Stabilization Board was established as a part of a new and independent agency, 
the Economic Stabilization Agency {E.S.A.), at the head of which was an 
administrator who was charged to "seek to preserve and maintain the stabi~i­
zation of the economy."31 The W.S.B. at its inception was composed of nine 
26. S.3936 and H.R. 9176, 8lst Cong.--2nd session (1950); see also the 
accompanying reports Senate No. 2250, August 7, 1950 and House No. 275'9 
July 29' 1950. ' 
27. Conference Report No. 3042, August 31, 1950, 8lst Cong.--2nd session ('1950). 
28. 64 Stat. 798 (1950), 50 U.S.C.2061 (Supp. V, 1952), approved Sept. 8, 1950. 
29. Conference Report No. 3042, August 31, 1950, 8lst Cong.--2nd session (~950). 
30. Executive Order 10161, Sept. 9, 1950, 15 F.R. 6105. 
31. Executive Order 10161, Sec. 40llb, Sept. 9, 1950. 
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members 32 appointed by the President and like the N.W.L.B. it was to be a 
tripartite board, the members equally divided in number as representatives 
of the public, labor and industry. One of the three members representing 
the public was to be designated by the President as Chairman of the Board. 
This system of tripartitism--of participation by representatives of the 
different phases of the economy ~n solving national problems--is generally 
J 
regarded as one of the best ways to get cooperation in making and carrying 
I 
out decisions affecting millions of employers and employees. 
The order defining the duties of the W.S.B. set forth its jurisdict:i!pn 
I 
as follows: 
"The Wage Stabilization Board shall make recommendations to the 
Administrator regarding the planning and development of Wage 
Stabilization Policies and shall perform such further functions 
vTi th respect to wage stabilization as may be determined by the 
Administrator after consultation with the Board." 33 
In addition to the W.S.B. two other wage stabilization boards were created 
under the authority of the Defense Production Act of 1950, the Salary Stabili-
zation Board, 34 and the Railway and Airlines Wage Board.35 Neither_of these 
,\ 
32. Board reconstituted into 18-man board by Executive Order 10233, April 21, 
1951. ' 
33. Executive Order 10161, Sept. 9, 1950, 15 F.R. 6105. 
34. Created within the Economic Stabilization AgennWjr pursuant to Executive 
Order No. 10161, Sept. 9, 1950, 15 F.R. 6105 and by General Order No., 8, 
May 10, 1951, 16 F.R. ~356 of the E.S.A. terminated April 30, 1953, pur-
suant to Executive Order No. 10434 of Feb. 6, 1953, 18 F.R. 809; consid-
ered stabilization of salaries and was constituted by an all-public-mem-
ber group; this board was responsible for "the stabilization of salaries 
and other compensation of persons who are employed in bona fide executive, 
administrative, professional, or outside salesmen capacities, except 
driver salesmen, as each of such terms is defined in the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of June 25, 1938, ascamended, and who in their relationship 
with their employer are not represented by duly recognized or certified 
labor organization?. 11 
3 5. Established Sept. 27, 1951, by General Order 7, revised, of the E. S .A,. 
pursuant to Section 403 of the Defense Production Act of 1950. Termi-
nated April 30, 1953, pursuant to Executive Order No. 10434 of Feb. 6, 
1953, 18 F.R. 809; considered problems of stabilization of railway and 
airlines employees as defined in the Railway Labor Act. 
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boards involved the complexities nor participated in wage problems of t~e 
scope and national importance as did the W.S.B. and consequently further' dis-
cussion in this paper of the effectiveness of these boards is not attempted. 
D. Comparison of World War II and Korean Wage Stabilization Legislation. 
The history of the development of wage stabilization during World War II 
and the KOrean Conflict seems to emphasize the vast difference in the economic 
I 
structure of the nation in 1941 and in 1950. This vast difference in the 
economic structure of the nation may clearly be shown by comparison of the 
economic facts present in 1940 and in the 1950's. These are as follows: I' 
I 
1) In the 1940 's at the beginning of Wor1c;tctWar II a 70% rise in ouil,Put 
was anticipated rrhile in the 1950 's prior to the ~orean War the 
economy of the country was operating at near full capacity; 
2) In the 1940's there were seven million unemployed while in the 1950's 
there were but three million unemployed and the total labor force ex-
ceeded that of 1940 by ten million; 
3) In 1940 a rise in output was possib~e by increasing the man-hour out-
put which was achieved by the utilization of unused plant facilities 
I 
and high quality labor reserve, while in 1950 only a small improye-
ment in man-hour output could be obtained; technological and man4ger-
ial gains were offset by the pressure from limited resources and 
facilities; 
4) In 1940 the nation had large reserves of raw materials while in !950 
reserves ~ere depleted; 
5) In the years follmTing 1941 the nation depended on a rise in output to I 
keep inflationary pressures down while in the years following 1950 the 
reliance was upon a reduction of private spending for ~onsumer goods 
and private investment to hold down inflation.
36 
36. Harris, op. cit., p. 110. 
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While these few years represent an insignificant figure in the'chronolical 
history of this country a vast difference in economic strength, enough to· 
establish a new economic era, 37 has come about in the years during and after 
c:) World War II.38 
J 
The enactment and enforcement of the economic controls for the peri~d 
during World War II and the period during the KOrean Conflict follow a 
striki~gly dissimilar pattern. The controls of 1950 were passed as a single 
integrated piece of legislation and administered by one separate.independent 
agency while in 1942 wage stabilization was accomplished out of many sepa~ate 
and diverse laws enfor~ed by an established administrative Board. Withouu 
question, the experience of a war, and wartime economy, unfortunate as it was, 
I 
did prove invaluable to Congress in drafting and to the Executive in admini-







COMPARISON OF· GNP ON EXPENDITURES FOR 1939, 1944 and 1950'S 





Personal Gross Net 
Consumption Private Foreign 
Expendi- Domestic Invest-
tures Investment ment 
67.5 9·9 0.9 
111.6 7·7 -2.1 
184.5 44.0 -2.0 
Gov't . 
Purchases 
of Goods & 
Securities , 
Source: Economic Report of President, July 1950 
Excellent indicator of the gross national product of a country is the '• 
kw. hours of electrical energy produced. In 1940, 141.8 billion kw. 
hours were produced but in 1950, 329.1 billion kw. hours were produced 
or about 2-l/4 times as much electrical power. 
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I II •. Administration of the Wage Stabilization Program During the Korean 
Conflict. 
A. Acceptance of Wage Stabilization by Industry and Labor. 
No doubt the success during the early :part of World War II of the labor-
industry voluntary :pledge of 11no strike, no lockout, 11 as weli as the early 
success at voluntary :price and wage control, remained clear in the memory of 
I 
the President and Congress when legislation to stabilize the economy wa~ 
drafted during the summer of 1950. While the economy of the country was much 
different in 1950 than in 1942 the Congress and the President nevertheless ]I 
:promoted the rather optimistic thought that wages and :prices during the emer-
gency could voluntarily be stabilized. The request for both labor and 
industry to "hold the line 11 :proved to be unrealistic and the resulting con-
fusion now seems to have been a very great price to :pay. 
Consideration of the acceptance of wage stabilization by industry and 
labor should begin with an analysis of the labor market :prior to June 1950. 
In 1949 the wage rates remained relatively stable and the benefits which1 
' 
I 
were awarded were for the most :part in the form of :pensions, health and wel-
l, 
' fare :programs. Early in 1950 the wage level began to rise in the antici:pa-
tion of a tighter labor market; certain employers granted voluntary wage 
increases and by early spring the economy was experiencing a tight labor 
market. In June into this volatile economic situation came Korea. Remem-
1 
bering the shortages of World War II, a wave of scare buying broke out, 
11 
raising the expenditure for consumer durable goods to the highest level ever 
attained. Consumer expenditure began tapering off in August. By November 
on a seasonally adjusted basis, it was back to the ·rate reached oefore the 
Korean War started. The tempo of the war was stepped up in December, and 
another wave of scare buying began. These spurts of scare buying by consum-
ers in the summer of 1950 and ag~in late in 1950 and early in 1951 force~ 
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output to maximum rates and led to rapid rises in prices.l 
I It was under these conditions that the D~fense Production Act of 1950. 
was debated and passed by Congress. Voluntary restraint and an attempt at 
stabilization, 2 not price fixing, was the rationale of the act. Title IV 
" 
of the D.P.A. of 1950 recited in part: " ••. the President may encourage and 
promote voluntary action by business, agriculture, labor and consumers."~ 
Under the authority of the D.P.A. of 1950 the President established, on 
September 12~ +950, the W.S.B. and directed the Board as follows: 
11The Wage Stabilization Board shall make recommendations to the 
Administrator (of the E.S.A.) regarding the planning and development 
of wage stabilization policies and shall perform such further func-
tions with respect to wage stabilization as may be determined by the 
Administrator after consultation with the Board."4 ' 
The advance of inflation was more rapid than the progress of the met~ods 
to combat it. Korea added pressure to the already active economy and while 
both ·labor and industry were asked to embrace the voluntary "hold-the!.line11 
policy it was not until September 8, 19505 that legislation to stabilize the 
economy was enacted into law. While W.S.B. was established shortly there-
6 
after the problems of continuing inflation were not solved by ~egislativ~ 
fiat. The aluminum industry settled near the end of 1950 for a 15-cent-~-
hour increase and the coal industry settled in January 1951 for a 20 -cent -,an-
hour increase. Inflation was well on the way. Higher increases seemed i~ 
the wind. The original acceptance by labor and industry of a voluntary 
11hold -the -1ine 11 policy seemed all but forgotten. There had been no genuine 
1. Bratt, op. cit., pp.348, 349. 
2. Sec. 401 of the D. P .A. of 1950 in part states that the act seeks" ••• to,, 
stabilize the cost of living for workers and other consumers and the 
costs of production for farmers and businessmen ••• 11 
3. Sec. 402 (a) of the D.P.A. of 1950. . 1 
4. Executive Order No. 10161 of Sept. 9, 1950, 15 F.R. 6105, Sec. 403 (b). 
5. The D.P.A. of 1950, 64 Stat. 798 (1950). 
6. Established by Executive Order 10161, Sept. 9, 1950, 15 F.R. 6105. 
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acceptance of wage stabilization by either labor or industry.7 
On January 26, 1951, six months after the inflationary spiral got udder 
" 
way and more than three months after passage of the act providing authority 
to stabilize prices and wages, the Government issued an across-the-board 
freeze on prices and wages. 8 This action caught many in industry and 
labor off guard and resulted in an unfair penalty visited upon those who 
I' 
followed the Presidential call to hold the 1ine.9 In the wake of price 1and 
wage increases the nine-man tripartite board of the W.S.B. was directed.by 
ESA-GWR 1 to hold wages, salaries and other compensation at the January 25, 
1951 level. It seems now abundantly clear that had some temporary price:: and 
wage control been established in June of 1950 and subsequently modified as 
Congress further investigated the type of stabilization required, a more: 
equitable and a more satisfactory program of stabilization could have be~n 
worked out. The W.S.B. in early 1951 faced what seemed to many an impossible 
10 
task. 
The problem facing the nine-man w.s.B. was clearly drawn--there must be 
some adjustment of wages to bring ih line those wage rates which were not 
increased during the previous ten months to correspond with the increase in 
cost of living. Approximately 6o% of all workers had received increases 1 
7· See infra, footnote 33· 
8. Simultaneously with the freeze regulation ESA-GWR 1 was issued which 
required the approval of the W.S.B. for any increase in wages. 
9· Substantial inequities may arise from a price ~reeze because: 1) there are 
frozen into the price structure many temporary prices such as tnose 
arising from special sales, depressed prices, seasonal prices, etc.; 2) 
wholesale prroces rise faster than retail prices and it takes time before 
the latter fully reflect these increases in cost; 3) industries and labor 
unions whroch dRswered the Government's plea to hold the line had their 
• I prices frozen at this level while those which did not follow the hold-the-
line order had theirs frozen at a higher level. Backman, op. cit., p.319. 
10. The lack of cooperation by both business add labor was obvious from the 
attitude tOivard controls voiced during the W.S.B. hearings on JanuarJr 10 
and 11, 1951. See interview with Dan Valentine, U.S. News and World 
Report, January 12, 1951, p. 25. 
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ranging up to and in some cases in excess of 10% over January 15, 1950, ~hen 
wages were stable.11 
Following the freeze of January 26, 1951 the W.S.B. issued a series;'of 
regulations, each one attempting to "thaw out" the freeze and permit increases 
in certain situations.12 A great industry-labor conflict arose over the formu-
lation of GWR 6--the lo% "catch-up" provision. The ivork of the Board in 
drafting the wage adjustment regulation GWR 6 was long and prolonged the 1con-
flicts between the industry and labor members were apparent. These conflicts 
I 
became so strong that the labor members sought to gain sympathy for thei~ cause 
by the public declaration of their stand. On February 13, 1951, the labor 
members publicly urged the Board to issue a catch-up formula incorporating a 
I 
12% increase over the January 1950 vTage levels. l3 The· public members wer~ not 
in sympathy with the argument of the labor members and on Friday) Februar\y 16, 
1951, following an all-night session of the Board, the public members joined 
with the industry members and with a vote of 6 to 3 the W.S.B. issued GWR! 6 
incorporating the controversial 10% "catch-up" formula. With this disappoint-
ment the labor members withdrew from the Board and in so doing issued the 
following statement: 
1~e have tonight withdrawn from the Wage Stabilization Board in protest 
against an attempt to do a great injustice to all .Americans vTho work 
for wages and salaries •.• we cannot give our approval or be a party to 
the unfair and unworkable formula adopted by the industry and publiy 
members of this board. "14 
i 
I' 
The W.S.B. attempted to make clear to the public that Regulation 6 was 
not a formulation of the Board 1 s final wage policy. Regulation 6 was an 
interim effort to give relief to 40% of the workers who had received no 
11. Speech by Nathan P. Feinsinger, delivered in Dearborn, Michigan, on 
September 20, 1951. Mimeographed by W .S.B. and entitled "Wage Stabi:t;_i-
zation--Objectives and Methods. 11 
12. GWR 2,3,4 and 5 each permitted increases without prior approval of t~e 
.w.s.B., certain increases generally allowed by conflicting laws or p~e­
viously agreed upon through collective bargaining but not yet in eff~ct. 
13. New York Times, Wednesday, Feb. 14, 1951, page 1, col. 6. 
14. New York Times, Friday, Feb. 16, 1951, "Wage Board Votes 10% Pay Rise 
Formula; Labor Group Quits, 11 page 1, col. 4. 
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relief15!-:rrom the ten months of inflation following the beginning of the 
Korean crisis in June 1950. 
16 The withdrawal of the labor members from the Board appears to take on a 
more profound aspect than is apparent from the statement issued by the labor 
members showing their displeasure at the 10% "catch-up" formula. 17 
Labor was displeased at the long chain of command between the labor 'mem-
bers on the Bqard and the President.18 Appeals had to be taken from the ~oard 
' 
I 
through the E.S.A. and through the Of~ice of Defense Mobilization.19 It was 
not possible to appeal direct tbethe President as was done during World War II20 
I 
and consequently labor apparently thought that its effectivefuess was diluted by 
these intermediate agencies. Thus by the end of February 1951 the wage s~abili-
zation program, while not completely inert, was not accorded cooperation from 
either labor or industry and this dissension seriously threatened the entire 
mobilization program. 
15. GWR 6 issued Feb. 27, 1951 permitted without prior Board approval general 
increases up to 10% over the wage and salary levels in: effect on Jan:. 15, 
1950. 
16. Labor's 1'1alkout was not over the 10% formula alone. It was to dramatize 
labor's gripe against Wilson. Unions charged that Wilson dictated the 10% 
~ormula. Also labor asked Wilson to name an assistant from their ranks to 
head up manpower. Wilson's answer was that he wanted any man from labor 
to sever his union ties, spend full time at O.D.M. (Of~ice of Defense 
Mobilization). Labor felt it had been turned down and reluctantly agreed 
to serve on an O.D.M. advisory committee. Another grievance of labof 
with Wilson was that labor wanted manpower policy to be left in the hands 
of-their friend Labor Secretary Tobin after their ~irst request of an 
assistant on manpower policy to be named from the ranks of labor. Thls 
request also was denied. When Dr. Arthur Flemming, former m~mber of 'U.S. 
Civil Service Commission, got the post Business Week, "Labor Walks Out 
On Mobilization", February 24, 1951 
17. Perhaps we recall what Voltaire said about man's thoughts: "Men use 
thought only as authority for their injustice and employ speech only to 
conceal their thoughts." Dialogue 14, Le Chapen et la Poularde (1763). 
18. Recommendations of the Board were given to the Administrator of the E.S.A. 
and it was the Administrator, not the President, who initiated conferences 
betvre:en management and labor. Executive Order No. 10161, Sept. 12, Ji950, 
15 F.R. 6105. 
19. Executive Order No. 10193, Dec. 19, 1950, 15 F.R. 9031 appoints such ·a 





The labo~ members did not return to the Board during the next two 
months, and representation of labor on the W.S.B. was vTithheld until the 
Board was reconstituted to an 18-man tripartite Board on April 21, 1951.21 
The establishment of the 18-man tripartite Board with new functions was 
according to a recommendation to the President by the National Advisory Board 
on Mobilization Policy. 22 . This Advisory Board was asked to recommend how the 
W.S.B. was to be reconstituted and the Advisory Board, vTith industry members 
dissenting, sent, on April 17, 1951,' its recommendations to the President. 
The first Board had wage stabilization functions but was not empowered 11to 
handle disputes; the recommendations of the Advisory Board included prdvision 
for handling labor disputes. The magnification of the power and import1~ce 
of the W.S.B. was vigorously opposed by ind~stry but these objections did not 
prevail and the President on April 21, 1951 by Executive Order reconstituted 
the W.S.B. to an 18-man tripartite Board according to the recommendations of 
I • 
the Advisory Board. 23 Labor had won its victory. The W.S.B. after April 21, 
I 
1951 looked more lU;:e the N.if.L.B. of iilorld War II and perhaps this was ,,a 
more realistic view. 24 
During the time that the Board ceased to function three important wage 
regulations were issued by the Economic StabilizationAdministrator. 25 When 






Executive Order No. 10233, April 24, 1951, 16 F.R. 3503.' 
Established by Executive Order No. 10224, March 15, 1951, 16 F.R. 2543. 
Executive Order No. 10233 which gave to the Board certain disputes func-
tions and brought the Board more under the direct review· of the President. 
The Board ivas given jurisdiction to disputes only after collective par-
gaining and mediation and conciliation had failed, and only if the par-
ties agreed to submit to the Board or if the President referred the dis-
pute to the Board. 
The new Board was not organized and did not begin functioning until May 8, 
1951· see' 11A Report on Wage Stabilization" by Dr. George W. Taylor, 
Augu~t 29, 1951, mimeographed. Dr. Taylor was the retiring chairmar,t of 
the W.S.B. 
Regulations issued were: Gii1R 8, Giim 9 and G\-1R 10. 
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26 
zation policies: 1) the 10% acatch-up" f'ormula, 2) the base date abnor-
1 . t 27 1' ) I 28 ma 1 y po 1cy, and 3 the 'tandem" regulation. 
It was with these existing regUlations that the new Board began to review 
the long list of' pending cases. For the moment the intra-Board conf'lict ''was 
I' 
at an end and vrith the revision of' the "tandema regulation on May 23, 1951, the , 
new Board began to show that acceptance of' the wage stabilization policy by 
industry and labor was, at long last, to become a reality. 29 
B. The Ef'f'ect of' Collective Bargaining Upon the Wage Stabilization Prog~am. 
In drafting the Defense Production Act of 1950 Congress chose to en-1 
courage the settlement of labor disputes during the emergency by collecti~e 
bargaining and stated this as the national policy in the following ivords :1 
aThe national policy shall be to place primary reliance upon the parties 
to any labor dispute to make every effort through negotiation and collec-
tive bargaining and the f'ull use of mediation and conciliation facili-
ties to effect a settlement in the national interest." 30 
26. Vol. 16 F.R. 1 pg. 1951--GRW 6 Issued Feb. 1951. 10% catch-up formuia. 
If gener~l increases in wage and salary levels in an appropriate emp~oyee 
unit have been less than ten percent since the base pay period, future 
increases in wages, salaries and other compensation may be permitted in 
amounts up to but not in excess of the dif'ference between past incre~ses 
if any and the permissible 10%--16 F.R. p. 1951 
27. Sec. 4 of' G.W..R. Base pay period abnormalities. Companies with no p~y­
roll period on or about January 15, 1950 because they were not in opera-
tion at that time or having abnormal pay levels during that period 
because of seasonal peculiarities, broad changes in product mix, wide 
swings in employment could apply to the W .S.B. f'or adjustments if th~: 
base date pay level figures against which employee compensation changes 
are to be measured. ' 
28. F .R. Vol. 16, p. 2223 GWR 10 issued March 8, 1951. Tandem relations,hips. 
definition--a well established and consistently maintained practice where-
by the precise timing, amount and nature of general increases ron the 
wages, salaries and other compensation of a given.appropriate unit have 
so followed those of another unit of employees ~f the same employer or 
I 
of other employers in the same labor mkt. Relationship applicable to;, 
work perf'ormed mn or before Feb. 9, 1951. Submission of proof of tan~em 
relationship. 16 F.R. p. 2223. 
29. For a report on the early problems and success of' the new Board see 
Taylor, op. cit. 
30. D.P.A. of 1950, Sec. 502, P.L. 774, 8lst Cong.--2nd sess. (1950). 
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With the large demand for civilian goods together with the defense 
requirements for both manpower and the production'of goods for war, there was 
no room for any old-fashioned collective bargaining. Congre~s, however, 
~ wisely decided to place primary reliance upon negotiation and collective 
bargaining with assistance from government agencies,· rather than to resort 
to all-out government control~of industrial relations. In the summer of 1950 
Congress, in enacting the D .P .A. of 1950, sought to follow the scheme vrhf·ch 
successfully worked during World War II, that of voluntary settlement of .dis-
putes in the interest of the needs of the country at vrar. 3l 
The D. P. A. of 1950 in order to foster this voluntary settlement of1 dis-
putes provided that:· 
" •.• the President is authorized (1) to initiate voluntary conference~ 
between management, labor and such persons as the President'may des~g­
nate to represent the government and the public ••• "32 
The Government sought to bring to both labor and industry the importance 
I 
and int'erest of the country as a vrhole; by merely seeking to intervene and not 
I 
to control the process of collective bargaining the Government left both labor 
I 
and industry. free to arrive at wage settlements so long as the settlemen~ was 
31. 
32. 
For a brief discussion of voluntarism during World War II and immedia~ely 
thereafter see G.W. Taylor, Government Regu1ation ~ Industrial Relations 
(1948), PP· 7-10. 
D.P.A. of 1950, Sec. 502. 
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consistent vrith the national policy.33 This freedom vrithin a sphere of 
i 
government intervention was absolutely necessary to assure maximum pro-
duction. We need not speculate here on the consequence of a rigid Govern-
ment-dictated ivage price policy. Theeffectiveness of a government wage 
policy and the success of any production program is largely determined by 
the success with which the line is drawn between government control an,a 
voluntary agreement. 
The reluctance of Congress to enter into planned control of the economy 
is best illustrated by this statement in the act itself: 
"It is the intent of Congress that the authority conferred ••• shall be 
exercised in accordance ivith the policies set forth in_ ••• this Act, and 
in particular with full consideration and emphasis, so far as practi-
cable, on the maintenance and furtherance of the American system of ·com-
petitive enterprise ••• the maintenance and furtherance of sound workipg 
relations, including collective bargaining •.• "34 
I 
The desire of Congress as set forth in Sec. 2 of the D.P.A. of 1950 :to 
promote the national defense and to stabilize wages and prices35 gave the 
33. The D.P.A. of 1950, Sec. 503, recites that " ••• due regard shall be
1 
given 
to terms and conditions of employment established by prevailing collec-
tive bargaining practice which will be fair to labor and management alike, 
and will be consistent with stabilization policies established under 
this Act. 11 "Government intervention in wage determination inevitably 
tends to restrict the area of free collective bargaining' promotes in-
dustrial unrest, and restricts the ef.forts of management, particularly 
the small employer, to obtain the manpoioTer necessary for maximum pro-
duction. Congress nevertheless in providing for wage stabilization, 
advisea·the President that the stabilization program was to be fo~ed 
so that, in addition to protecting the value of the dollar, efforts were 
to be made (1) to preserve the institution o£ collective bargaining; 
(2) to prevent labor disturbances, and (3) to foster maximum defense 
production. 11 Statement by Nathan P. Feinsinger, July 18, 1952, 11Wage 
Board's Record;" 30 L.R.R.M. 91, 93 (1952). 
34. D.P.A. of 1950; Sec. 401. 
35. D.P.A. of 1950, Sec. 2 
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President a complex problem. The pressure of collective bargaining on the 
wage economy as well as the desire of business to seek large profits during 
the period of high demand and limited supply resulted in a stabilization 
Q policy suited to the economy of the Korean Conflict. TheW .S.B. attempted dur-
ing this period of limited mobilization to continue labor's program towar,¢1. the 
0 
0 
gradual improvement of real wages while confining the rate of improvemen~' to 
the accepted limits established by stabilization.36 
In reviewing the selection by Congress of a "wage stabilization" rather 
< 
than a 'wage freeze" program, Chairman Nathan D. Feinsinger stated: 
"Congress had deliberately rejected the notion of a 'wage freeze 1 and 
instead adopted the notion of 'wage stabilization.' The object ivas 
not to prevent wage increases but to insure an orderly movement th~re­
of and equally to insure the country got what it paid for in the aims 
production program. Congress wisely did not lay down any detailed 
blueprint for the administration of wage controls. Instead, it 
issued a broad mandate for fair and equitable regulations, to be 
administered in such a way as to avoid or correct hardships and 
inequities. "37 
The President charged the W.S.B. with a difficult task: the stabilization 
of wages in the face of the increasing pressure of prices and the demands for 
increased wages. The delay in establishing the initial price-wage freeze 
caused considerable harm and magnified the difficulties of the Board. When 
the reconstituted Board began to function in May of 1951 the dissatisfacti9n 
with the Korean Conflict made enforcement of the regulations more difficul~; 38 




For an interesting study of this problem of stabilization see J. H. 
Kaufmann, 11Problems of Coordination Price and Wage Programs in 1950-19~3," 
29 Ind. L.J. 499-537 and 30 Ind. L.J. 18-58 (1954); on this particular 
point see p. 39· 
Statement by Nathan P. Feinsinger, July 18, 1952, delivered in San 
Francisco and entitled ''Wage Board's Record," 30 L.R.R.M. 91, 94 (1952). 
"A large segment of the American public has never been fully convinced 
that Korea was more than a skirmish or that wage and price controls were 
really necessary. Even today with the threat of Communist military aggres-
sion more plain than ever, there is at best a grudging acceptance of cqn-
trols and a feeling of lfbusiness as usual. " Statement by Nathan P. 
Feinsinger, July 18, 1952, 30 L.M.M.R. 91, 93 (1952). 
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seemed to make the attempt at ~age stabilization only a token effort. 
The dissatisfaction with the wage stabilization program became more and 
more apparent. Labor pointed out the looseness of the stabilization po]'icy 
toward price controls and the absence of any farm price freeze. Labor'~ exer-
cise of its right to seek wage increases by collective bargaining gave the 
reconstituted Board many cases under its disputes function; and the Boar,a vras 
urged by labor to formulate a policy by which bot~ labor and industry copld 
be guided during the period of stabilization--a request to duplicate the: "Little 
Steel Formula" of World War II. 
However, ·with the exception of the regulations "thavring out" the January 
I' 
1951 wage freeze and those issued to ameliorate certain inequities, the W.S.B. 
refused to formulate any general wage stabilization policy. The Board was 
fearful that any such policy which attempted to name a ceiling would in fact 
become a goal and accordingly the Board issued the following statement: 
" .•. if the Board is to preserve the value of collective bargaining to the 
fullest practicable extent, it must stay out of the collective bar-
gaining room and must not jeopardize any proposal or counterpropos~l 
during the bargaining process. The Board, therefore, cannot and will 
not undertake to prescribe the permissible 'limitations' beforehand 
under which the parties can or must bargain •.• the important question 
under wage stabilization is not what the parties may ggree upon but 
what the Board will approve. "39 
Collective bargaining, though a right guaranteed to labor under the laws 
of the nation, 40 could not be exercised during the emergency period so a~ to 
thwart the stabilization program. Collective bargaining therefore was s~bject 
41 
to necessary restraints during this period. The Board was aware that i 
collective bargaining was not free to the same extent as before the advent 
of the stabilization program. The functions of the Board did impose 
39. Statement by W .S.B., "The Wage Stabilization Board and Collective Bar-
gaining," Sept.· 21, 1951, Press Release W .S .B. -112. 
4o. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Sec. 101, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. 
157 (1952). 
41. Taylor, 11Report on Wage Stabilization, "p. 3. 
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limitations ~n-·~he process of free collective bargaining. 42 These limita-
tions were temporary and they were necessary because of a more paramount! 
consideration--the common weal. Within the area limited by the Board there 
was room for genuine collective bargaining·and the evidence of the many 
settlements achieved through collective bargaining and approved by the 




See statement by Nathan P. Feinsinger before House Committee on Education 
and Labor, Wednesday, Ma.y 7, 1952, Appendix, "vlage Stabilization Board 
and Collective .Bargaining• 11 
See '~Wage Stabilization--Objectives and Methods, n speech by Nathan P ·' 
Feinsinger, Sept. 20, 1951. Consideration of the steel case far exceeds 
the scope of this paper and ivill not be included in this brief survej on 
vrage stabilization and collective bargaining problems. 
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• 
III. Economic Analysis of the Wage Stabilization Program 
A. Objectives of a 'U1age Stabilization Program. 
The complex nature and importance of the wage-p~ice structure in .our 
economic system made the formulation of a wage stabilization polic:y: no !,easier 
I 
for Congress in the summer of 1950 than in the early years of World vTar II. 
While the experience of Congress with the controls of World War II proved to 
be an invaluable asset, the overall.objectives of the wage stabilization pro-
gram proposed in 1950 differed little from those of 1942. 
An accept·able wage policy should include the following three objectives: 
1) 
2) 
A control measure to help hold down a runaway period of inflation; 
I 
A protective measure to help maintain labor's real wage and standard 
I 
of living; 
3) A measure to help ease the readjustment from a defense economy to a 
civilian economy following the emergency. 1 
The acute danger to the economy during a period of high arms production 
is runaway inflation. When the Korean Conflict plunged this country into a 
'tolar the demand upon the productivity of the nation, because of our civilian 
needs, was at an all-time high. Coupled iolith this civilian demand for gpods 
was an urgent need for the materials of war. The President recognized trat 
the capacity of our economy was not so great as to supply the war machin~, 
even though this ioTas not to be an all-out effort like World War II, and to 
supply the civilian markets, io7i thout some inflation. In his Midyear Economic 
Report of 1950 the President stated the problem of inflation in the following 
ioTOrds: 
1. 
"A primary duty of Government is 'to provide for the common defense.' 
In fulfilling this responsibility, the test is not how far we can go 
Committee for Economic Development, Price and Wage Controls, pp. 8-10. 
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~thou~ placing strain upon the domestic economy or without creating 
~nflat~onary pressures. We must go as far as changing circumstances 
may require. n2 
The controls are necessary to counteract the increased personal anq 
~ business incomes which result from defense production relative to the o,utput 
of dOnsumer goods. Workers are attracted to the more lucrative jobs i~ the 
I 
defense production industries; and accordingly, either because of the 
limitations on raw materials, manufacturing facilities or the labor force, 
there is a reduction in the output of civilian goods. The inevitable result 
of too many dollars bidding for too few goods leads to the harmful effects of 
I 
inflation. 3 
There are some qualifications to the general statement that as defense 
production gets under way there follows a reduction in consumer goods. This 
reduction will occur When the economy reaches full employment and when the 
I 
sources of secondary workers (new entrants to the labor force for the e~er-
~~ 
gency period, for example, housewives, college students) have been exhausted. 
When these two conditions have been fulfilled then any additional workers 
needed for defense preparation will have to be taken from the civilian.produc-
1 
tion industries and hence a reduction in the production of consumer commodities 
will be inevitable. Also the fact that a large proportion of the male 
1 
populatbn serve in the Armed Forces during such a defense emergency further 
reduces the labor supply and naturally the consumer production industries. 
The excess demand which is created by the defense spending of the Govern-
ment and the increase in personal incomes further stimulates a rise in prices 
' and wages. Wage and price stabilization can delay this harmful effect of a 
2. Midyear 1950 Economic Report to Congress, President H. S. Truman •. 
3. For an excellent review of the economic situation following the outb~eak 
of the Korean Conflict and the subsequent wage-price spiral see House Report 
No. 639, June 22, 1951 82nd Cong.--lst sess. (1951). 
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spiral economy. The control of wages also helps to prevent a sharp increase 
in the prices of materials vital to the defense program and thereby further 
reduces the inflationary effects in the economy. 4 
A further inflationary danger to the economy during a period of hi~h arms 
production is that labor's money wage will lag behind the increases in 'the 
cost of living. Even though labor may seek and obtain some w·age increases, 
these increases may not be sufficient to offset the rise in the cost of1 ~iving. 
Adjustments in wages must be made to compensate for increases in living costs 
to prevent a decline in real wages which will eventually lead to deterioration 
.in living standards. It is not possible by simple mathematics to asses~ 
labor's real wage today because of the complex fringe benefit plans of the 
different industries) such as paid holidays, paid sick leave, pensions, ,health 
and welfare funds. 
~other danger follows the period of high arms production. Inflationary 
pressures would be soaring during the change to a civilian economy. Tot'hl 
demand would increase rapidly and continue at least till the deferred demand 
I, 
of the war years was satisfied. It is desirable to ease the post-emergency 
transition from a war to a peacetime economy. 
By a gradual decontrol system, price stability may be maintained to a 
degree and thereby help to alleviate some of the post-emergency inflationary 
pressures. With the close of a defense production program, there ivould be an 
increase in consumer production and the accumulated unspent income of w~ 
days vdll bid for these goods and raise prices. This increase in prices will 
give rise to an increase in wages and start the >vage-price spiral again. If 
price and wage controls are entirely eliminated soon after cessation of hos-
tilities, then the wage-price spiral would operate and the demand for 
4. Backman, op. cit., p. 303. 
-26-
• 
consumer goods would not bring the spiral to a halt until after the consumer 
wants, which were curtailed during the emergency, are satisfied. It can be 
reasonably assumed that as soon as the reduction in demand begins, ther·e 
would be a slowing down of production and unemployment would begin to prevail 
I 
throughout the economy. Unemployment reduces the national income and there-
fore lowers the purchasing power of the country. 
Thus, the economy would be on the downswing of a recession period which 
could lead into depression. 
If price and wage controls are left on for a period after the emergency 
and then are gradua~ly eliminated this procedure would help to cushion some 
of the harmful effects present in a post-emergency economy. HOivever, it 
appears to me and many others5 that price .and wage controls are only an 
artificial means of controlling inflation. They deal primarily with the 
effect and not with the cause. Control of inflation through monetary and 
fiscal policy seems to be a better method because this policy deals with the 
cause of the entire problem. 
B. A Review of the Different Wage Control Systems. 
The Congress in the summer of 1950 was faced with the problem of 
enacting into law a complete economic system for the production program.! 
This system was to be designed and coordinated to bring about the rapid ex-
pans ion of the productive capacity of the nation, the manufacture of materials 
for war to supply Korea and the stabilization of the national economy. 
Various methods of price-wage stabilization were open to Congress and these 
I 
• basic systems of control will be rev.Ewed below. 
There are three main classes into which the many price-wage control 
5. Ibid., p. 238. 
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systems fall:6 
1) A strict hold-the-line policy; 
2) A flexible adjustment policy; 
3) A mixed flexible and hold-the-line policy. 
The strict hold-the-line policy is basically the freeze technique. Wages 
are frozen at a period prior to the issuance of the order. It is a stopgap 
method which can readily be imposed and is usually invoked to give the control 
authorities time to make the studies which are a prerequisite to the issuance 
) 
of other types of wage orders. Another advantage if that this system pre-
serves the many price and wage differentials vThich may arise out of com-
' petitive conditions, varying price-wage practices, product differentiation 
and other characteristics of our economy. 
How·ever, this type of system creates certain inequities, which is its 
main drawback. Even if prices and wages are held, costs may rise. The freeze 
may also catch some temporary prices and wages such as the seasonal lev~ls. 
I 
In the case of prices for "new, import and style11 produc-t;s, these create· 
additional problems to a system where prices and wages are closely wove~. 
However, the case for a hold-the-line policy would be strengthened and its 
limitations would be considered less serious in a period of all-out war. In 
a total war there is a larger excess demand for goods than any feasible 
monetary-fiscal policy could absorb. Some price and wage control is needed. 
Any increase in price and wage ceilings, hov1ever, would mean an equal and 
innnediate increase in prices and wages. Nevertheless ceiling adjustments can 
be allowed when needed without resulting in an equal amount of inflation. In 
a total war, people' s confidence in the value of the dollar and established 
price level may be so weakened that all price increases must be avoided to 
6. Connnittee for Economic Development, Price and Wage Controls, p. 11. 
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prevent public panic; and of coureye, in a state of emergency the futur~ must 
be sacrificed in consideration of the present. This system of rigid price 
and imge control necessarily interferes with the growth and adaptability of 
Q the economy; however, this fact is of minor importance in a war of survival. 
While this is objectionable to many groups, in a v7ar economy, it may be 
possible by a call to patriotic fervor to withstand pressure from the special 
political and economic groups which seek to obtain exemption from a general 
freeze. 7 
The flexible adjustment policy is a method of control in Which pric~ and 
. I 
v1age levels are generally established and subsequently adjusted according to 
the changes which take place in the economy. This type of program, while 
perhaps more desirable to many, is more complex and it is generally agr~ed 
that the price -iv-age controls should be used supplementary to a monetary ,1 
fiscal and saving policy to restrain inflation. These controls should be able 
to slovT down the increases in prices and v1age rates rather than profits and 
wage incomes. 
The measures devised to carry out a flexible adjustment policy of control 
should impose a comparable degree of restraint on the movement of ivages and 
salaries, of farm prices and of business prices. Further, the controls should 
be consistent with the defense program's goal of increasing production, but 
the controls should also provide for producers. an incentive to hold down 1 
their costs. Ideally the system should require some absorption of increases 
in costs for a limited period before these increases can be passed on in 




7. C.E.D., Price and Wage Controls, pp. 12-15. 
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Some of the methods of making subsequent wage adjustmentS to conform with 
a changing economy are: 
1) Cost-of-living adjustments; 
2) Wage inequity adjustments; 
3) Fringe payment adjustments; 
4) Substandard labor adjustments; and. 
5) Rare and unusual case adjustments. 
The cost-of-living adjustment is made to labor as a direct compensationlfor 




The i-Tage inequity adjustment is an adjustment in excess of the per cent 
change in standard of living because this applies to the particular employer 
who has paid his employees belovr the area i-Tage rate and therefore the 
employer must also correct this inequity. Th~ determination of the "area" is 
often a difficult problem. Consideration of the wage rates of competitor 
employers as well as comparisons between different plants of the same co~pany 
and betvTeen different companies in the same locality are often necessary in 
order to establish properly the "area". To make the consideration of alleged 
inequities complex is the fact that in addition to the basic wage there must 
also be considered the fringe benefits9 in order properly to evaluate each 
8. These wage adjustments might increase prices slightly by reason of t~e 
wage-price spiral. The price and wage· controls may have a role in pre-
venting the spiral of wages and prices, but it does not go to the 
fundamental source of the problem. · 
9. These fringes have different inflationary pressures. Pensions, paid 
holidays and other fringes may, in the aggregate, represent a substantial 
fraction of total v1age cost. In some cases they might constitute an 
inflationary factor, inasmuch as they are supplements to wage payments 
and increase income in a mobilized economy. In other cases, these frtnges 
might be diminished in value if they are not adjusted with the cost-of-
living increases. Also pensions may increase, while wage payments falling, 
if the cost-of-living decreases. 
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employee 1 s real wage. .And finally there are certain historic vrage 
differentials which must be considered. 
The fringe payment adjustment could be confined to an investigatiod of the 
,I 
local labor market or the particular industry. 
The substandard laQor adjustment would require special consideration 
because th~ lowest-paid workers often obtain very little benefit out of a 
percentage increase. Generally adjustments increasing wage rates to the mini-
mum prescribed by the Fair Labor Standards Act were permitted as a matter of 
I 
policy. When there is a cost-of-J.iving increase, the level of "substan4ards 11 
adjustment may exceed the minimum required by law. 
T.he rare and unusual cases constitute the exceptions to the other rules 
and the consideration of these cases for adjustment would have to be under-
taken by some wage adjustment agency. 10 
The objections to the flexible adjustment policy are that this system may 
merely legalize a rapidly rising, never-ending spiral of inflation; the system 
if not conscientiously administered may result in one grand cost-plus ecpnomy 
in which, the incentives to operate efficiently are impaired; and since this 
system involves a great quantity of paper work, because of its complexities, 
I 
it may prevent the authorities from properly administering or effectively 
enforcing the lavr .11 
The mixed flexible and hold-the-line policy is an artful combination of 
II 
each of the above. Generally the economic characteristics of such a ~ystem 
·would be that: 
1) Wage rates vmuld be permitted to rise in step with increases in cost 
10. Backman, op. cit., pp. 193-200. 
11. C.E.D., Price and Wage ContrDls, pp. J.8-35. 
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of living; 
2) Farm prices below parity would be uncontrolled; 
3) Farm Prices above the minimum legal levels would be fixed, subj~ct 
to provisions for relief in exceptio~al cases; and 
4) Industrial prices would be fixed, with provision for relief und~r an 
industry profit standard. 
This system of mixed flexible and hold-the-line policies would be inappr.o-
priate and damaging unless we were in an all-out war. Objections to this · 
I 
type of control system are that the prices which are flexible in the mixed 
system are elements of producer costs, wage rates, prices of agricultural raw 
materials and imported raw material prices. The price ceiling would be in the 
finished goods. , The result would be a narrowing of the margins between 'costs 
I' 
and prices; therefore distortions and impairments in production would bel in-
evitable. This system applies fundamentally different standards of control or 
,, 
absence of control to different classes of prices, without apparent reason 
other than political. This favoritism weakens the primary basis for 
voluntary support which is essential to a control program. Furthermore "j;he 
basic limitations or deficiencies cannot be corrected by "relief" provis~ons 
since the main reliance for preventing distortions of production under price-
wage control must be on the basis of over-all control by established standards 
and not by a case-by-case relief adjustment. 12 
The choice of which of the three systems is best suited to stabilize an 
economy and accomplish the objectives established depends primarily upon the 
I 
status of the economy at that specific time. 
C. Congressional Consideration and Enactment of the Wage Stabilization 
Program. 
12. II Committee for Economic Development, Economic Policy for Rearmament, pp. 
18-34. 
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During the summer of 1950, following the request of the President f6r a 
I 
complete production and stabilization program, Congress considered the 
various programs for stabilizing the economy. The program did not requ~re a 
• full all-out war economy like World War II but did require limited mobili-
zation and therefore because of the danger of inflation some form of wage 
and price controls was necessary. 13 
The demand for the materials of war was not so great that much of the 
civilian production would have to be stopped and therefore the stabiliz~tion 
I' 
programs were considered with a thought toward the system best suited tq a 
situation of half war and half peace. 
Each system of control previously considered has certain advantages land 
disadvantages but when reviewed in the light of the economy at hand, one of 
the three systems better accomplishes the objects and purposes which are in 
mind. The employment of a strict hold-the-line policy or a mixed flexible 
I 
and hold-the-line policy is unwise except in time of an all-out war economy. 
Accordingly, the system best adapted to a "guns and butter" economy is the 
flexible adjustment policy. The flexible adjustment system is well suited 
for a period of rearmament and the disadvantages in such a system can be 
surmounted by careful planning. 
The flexible adjustment system of price and wage control can restrain 
inflation without impairing the programs for rearmament and increased pro-
duction; The latitude afforded business and labor, while within the circle 
of reasonableness, establishes a desire and a reward for increased produ<1tion. 
Since this system restrains the natural activities of the economy the 
13. For a review of price and wage controls under a limited Federal 
mobilization program see Galbraith, John Kenneth, A Theory of Price 
Control (1952), p. 69. 
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continued employment of such a program would have damaging effects upon the 
nation. 
Congress understood these economic factors and selected the flexible ad-
t 
justment policy as the criterion for the Defense Production Act of 1950. The 
I 
D.P.A. of 1950 was a temporary measure and when passed in September of 1950 
the act provided sections relating to price and wage stabilization, the 
I 
settlement of labor disputes, and the control of consumer and real estate 
cred~t, to terminate on June 30, 1951. The success of the controls would be 
I 




~fuile the general policy of flexible adjustment was agreed upon by the 
members of the House and Senate, there arose a significant policy conflict 
over the application of the controls. 
The House bill (H.R. 9176) authorized the President to establish cei~ings 
with respect to materials and services, and with respect to 'tvages, salaries, 
and other compensation, either with respect to individual materials and 
services, or with respect to materials and services generally. The Sena~e 
bill (S. 3936) provided that action with respect to materials and services 
could only be taken with respect to such materials and services generally. 14 
Opposition to the selective controls was strenuously voiced from the Senate 
15 16 floor by Senator Taft and Senator Bricker as well as in the House by 
Representative Kunkel. 17 Senator Taft strongly and effectively urged th~ 
regulation of all prices and wages. 
14. See Conference Report No. 3042, Aug. 31, 1950, 8lst Cong. 2nd sess.Cl950). 
15. 96 Cong. Rec. 12269 (1950). 
16. Id. at 12893. 
17. Id. at 12117. 
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The two bills were sent to conference and the conference substitute~' pro-
vided that such actipn might be taken either vli th respect to individual1 
materials and services and to individual types of employment, or with respect 
I 
to materials, services, and types of employment generally. 18 
In a review of the early stabilization policies enacted in the summer of 
I 1950 Professor A. G. Hart supports the effort toward voluntarism but feels it 
I 
vras ill-timed and inappropriately invoked in the fall of 1950 and the vlinter 
,, 
of 1950-1951. He refers to the fiasco of voluntary price control in De9ember 
1950 and January 1951 as an example that " ••• a voluntary program is only too 
likely to be an excuse for avoiding a compulsory program that the situation 
demands. "19 Professor Hart agrees that II ••• at the same time' there is an 
important area for voluntary action."20 
The early difficulties of the wage stabilization program and the con-
comitant difficulties within the W.S.B. must not be laid upon the Defens.e 
Production Act of 1950 nor upon the economic system of stabilization emp~oyed. 
The difficulties were in the administration or more properly the lack of' ad-
ministration of the program by the Executive. The Senate Committee on 
'I • 
Banking and Currency, reporting on the 1952 amendments to the D.P.A. of 1950,2L 
p 
expressed its displeasure at the reluctance of the President to establish tem-
porary ceilings on wages and prices in the fall of 1950, in these words: 
1
, 
18. D.P.A. of 1950, Sec. 402. 
19. Hart, Albert G., Defense Without Inflation (1951), p. 155. 
20. Ibid. 1 
21. Senate Report No. 470, June 21, 1951, 82nd Cong.--lst sess. (1951); the 
1952 Amendments to the D.P.A. of 1950, Ch. 530, Public Law 429, 82nd 
Cong.--lst sess., enacted a new subsection to Sec. 403 of the D.P.A. 
vrhich established the W.S.B. by statute and provided for tripartite "com-
position betvreen labor, industry and the public with equal represen-t?a-
tion; this was a change from the original D.P.A.· which merely authoi,ized 
the establishment of the 't-T.S.B. under the authority of original Sec.!' 401 
and Sec. 501. 
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"Not until January 26, 1951, 6 months after the inf'lationare spiral1, 
got under way, and more than 3 months after the passage of the act pro-
viding authority for price and wage controls, was the accelerating price-
wage spiral finally met with an across-the-board freeze of prices and 
wages .•.• " 
......................................................................... 
" ••• your committee cannot refrain from expressing its deep disappointment 
over the delays which occurred before parts of this effective machinery 
/the D.P.A. of 195Qf--particularly in the stabilization area--were 
finally put to work. Since the authority was not exercised as quickly as 
it should have been, it has not yet been as effective as it could have 
been."22 
Economic analysis of the Korean Conflict clearly showed a different pro-
blem in 1950 than existed in 1942; Congress offered the adequate solution in 
the form of the Defense Production Act of 1950. The error of the President in 
I 
relying too long on voluntarism is now quite evident to all economists. 
Perhaps this is moot justification for an economist's point of view and 
adequate proof that because one method worked well at one time there is no 
I 
assurance the same method will again operate at a different time with eq~al 
satisfaction. 





IV. Wage Policies and Orders of the National Wage Stabilization Board. 
The Wage Stabilization Board, by Authority of Executive Order No. 10161 
of September 9, 1950, issued a number of wage orders promulgating the wage 
1 policy of the federal government. The policy was expressed in orders 
entitled "General Wage Regulation" (GWR) which were consecutively numbered 
as they were issued by the W.S.B. The history and administration of the 
W .S.B. and the issuance of the Regulations has been revie'\'Ted in Chapters I 
and II. In this chapter a review of selected GWR 's will be undertaken wi tli 
primary emphasis on the analysis of the GWR's in terms of their effect on 1 
prices and wages. 
The imposition of wage controls creates numerous difficulties for mem-
bers of the W.S.B., mainly these problems were encountered in deciding on the 
policies to be followed in the new stabilization program. From the experi-
ence of the W.L.B. in World War II the stabilization of wages meant a stabili-
zation of the rate of wages rather than stabilization of earnings. Thus it 
would be possible for the Board to approve certain wage adjustments once t~e 
rates are stabilized, so long as these wage adjustments do not unbalance the 
I 
stabilization program. A number of bases2 could have been used by the Boa~d 
for approval of wage adjustments. Some of the bases together with the pro~ 
blems facing the Board at that time follow:3 
• Cost of Living. Adjustments in '\'rages to compensate for increases in the cost 
of living were included previously in collective bargaining agreements accord-
ing to which wage rates were to be increased as the oost of living increased. 
1. 15 F.R. 6105 (1950). 
2. Bases as used here means policies for determining under what conditions 
wage changes could be made and formulas to be applied in determining how 
much of a change is allowable. 
3. Backman. op. cit. p. 193-194. 
-31-
These provisions were called escalator clauses. A cost of living adjustment 
provision posed many problems for the W .s .B. What would happen to the economy 
if the W.S.B. allowed the escalator clauses to run unchecked and increase the 
wage rates with each rise in the cost of living would depend on the effective-
ness of other controls. If the cost of living was stabilized then the escalator 
clauses could be neutralized. If the cost of living rose the escalator ,clauses 
would increase the upward pressures on prices and tend to speed the wage and 
price spiral. If the w.s.B. froze, these cost of living adjustment clauses the 
unions might demand revisions of their contracts on the ground that the!1escalator 
clauses were part of their original, bargained-for, contract and being deprived 
of a benefit they could properly demand an increase in wages to offset this loss. 4 
Under stabilization it would not be practical to ignore the changes in 
the cost of living because it would lead to a lower standard of living and a 
weakening of civilian morale. A compromise between the two extremes,·l~tting 
escalator clauses run unhampered, and freezing the adjustment clauses, was 
I 
sought by permitting the escalator clauses to operate to a certain ~evel and 
5 
no further. In March 1951, the W.S.B. issued General Wage Regulation 8 which 
said: 
''No prior approval is required for putting into effect wage and salary 
increases. which are requir~d by t'erms of cost of living escalator 
clauses contained in contracts which were executed on or before 1 . 
January 25, 19~1--these increases shall not exceed the 10% formVla6 
of GWR 6. n7 
Numerous problems arose following the promulgation of GWR 8. Some of the 
problems involved the establishment of the base date while two other problems 
4 . 16 F .R . p • 2032 • 
5· National Industrial Conference B. Business Record p. 48-52. 
6. GvT.R 6 permitted a 10% increase in wages if wages and salaries in an appropri-
ate Employee unit had been less than 10% since the base payperio~ of 
January 15, 1950. However, these increases allowed by 10% catch-up formula 
must not exceed the difference between past increases if any and the per 
missable 10%. 
7· 16 F.R. p. 2032. 
involved a questioning of the worth of the regulation itself and it was asked 
how much and how long would the wage adjustments be tied to the cost of living. 
Interplant Inequities: 
I In a tight labor market some of the resistance to worker mobility is 
lessened because the worker becomes confident of his ability to find a new 
job. Therefore the lower-paying employer finds himself at a di~advantagb, since 
he is forced to m~ke wage adjustmen~s not only for cost of living increases but 
also to eliminate the wage inequities which exist between his plant and the plant 
of his higher paying competitors if he desires to retain his labor force or 
reduce his labor turnover. 1 
The attitude of the Board on this issue was that the wage structure of 
this country contains a vast number of wage differentials among different 
plants and occupations. The Board considered such differentials normal as they 
had developed out of sound economic and collective bargaining factors. There-
fore the W.S.E. did not consider wage differentials for workers on comparable 
1' 
occupations but in different plants in themselves to be gross inequities. 
However} in an inflationary period because manpower is in high demand ttie 
2 difference between wage rates in comparable occupations becomes small. 
Employees seek a higher wage level and employers desire to make the nec~ssary 
upward adjustment so as to increase wages in order to acquire or hold ssarce 
labor. 3 A stabilization program which ivould not be flexible enough to adjust 
I, 
to this would create hardships and gross inequities. 
Section 402 o~ the DPA of 1950 required that the program of wage stabili-
zation be adjusted so as to prevent hardships or inequities. To apply this 
1. Backman} op. cit. p. 195· 
2. As the labor market tightens some of the resistance to labor mobility is 
lessened because workers become more confident of their ability to find 
another job quickly. In order to retain his labor force an employer must 
try to eliminate the "inequities" which exist between his wage rates and 
those of his competitors for labor. 
3· 16 F.R. p. 11237. 
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:policy of the Board G. W .R. 17 was issued. 
This regulation :permitted wage adjustments on the ground that wage rates 
were sufficiently below those of comparable :plants in the industry or lbcality 
to result in gross inter:plant inequities. From this regulation many admini-
strative :problems evolved for the Board. One of the most difficult was the 
,, 
:problem of making :proper comparison between the :plants which establishe~ the 
alleged inequities. The regulation limited the comparison to the :plants in 
the same industry or locality; therefore, the geographic determination of the 
locality was left to the Board. The Board had to answer the question whether 
the comparison in a certain industry should be made separately for each city, 
I 
,, 
metropolitan or collective bargaining area. The :proper definitio~ of the 
industry involved had to be made. For example many steel fabrication concerns 
I 
objected to being classified in the same industrial group as U.S. Steel, or 
Bethlehem Steel. Their argument was that the economic characteristics of 
steel £abrication were sharply divergent from those of the basic steel :pro-
4 ducers. 
Furthermore a job having the same title in different :plants or in differ-
ent companies may require varying duties and responsibilities. Different 
employers have different fringe :payments and :proper evaluation of these, fringe 
benefits had to be made by the Board before adequate analysis of the wage 
rates could be made. 5 
From GWR 17 the Board's :policy toward the :problem of interplant inequity 
was stated as follows: 
111) 
2) 
Establish first an appropriate group of establishments in an appropri-
ate industry or area with whose wage and salary rates the :p~titioner's 
rates are to be compared; 
Comparison will be made with a limited number of key job clas,sifica-
tions relatively standardized throughout the comparison group; 
4. Backman o:p. cit. :p. 195-196. 
5. ~National Industrial Conference Board Business Record. :p. 49. 
3) Where a uniform rate prevails in· comparison group of establish-
ments for a preponderance of employees the WSB will approve 
petitions to increase wage and~laryrates up to and including 
stabilized levels; 
4) If the WSB grants the petitioner's increases in full such in-
creases will not in the future be used as a basis for intra-plant 
inequities. The Board must give consideration to the necessity for 
maintaining balanced and stabilized intra-plant wage relationships."6 
Fringe Benefits 
Industrial benefits which were not part of the wage rate itself but which 
were nonetheless compensation to the employee were termed fringe benefi~s. 
I' 
Examples of these were night-shift premiums, paid vacations, h~lidays, paid 
sick leave, health and w·elfare funds. Inasmuch as pensions, paid holidays 
and the like constituted a great portion of the total wage cost ih an industry, 
I 
they constituted an inflationary factor, by adding to incomes of the workers. 
Fringes, therefore, had to be regulated by the stabilization program. ~he 
policy established by the Board was to continue the fringes in an industry 
or in an area~ During World War II certain national fringes were permitted 
regardless of industrial practic~ e.g. six paid holidays, one week vacation 
after one year of service and t\'ro weeks after five years. I 
It appeared to many that the fringes were a safety valve on the Wage 
Stabilization Program. The Board was accused of allowing increases by i'vay of 
fringe benefits which ordinarily it never would have allowed. The Board was 
also charged with letting wages go up while appearing to keep them down ,• The 
answer the Board gaye to these accusations was that the great upward pressure 
on wages was very powerful and to hold the line was in theory an excellent 
solution but such action would have resulted in wholesale and uncontrolled 
violation of the Wage Stabilization Program. In allowing some fringes such as 
paid vacations and holidays, the Board took some of the antagonism of labor 
6. 16 F.R. p. 11237 
_1. Backman op. cit. p. 201. 
.,.J.t.l-
2 
and industry from the program. 
The policy of the Board to permit controlled increases in wage raies 
through fringe benefits was set forth in broad language of G.W.R. 13 w~ch 
in part reads as follows: 
"The Board will act upon fringe benefits which do not exceed prevailing 
industry or area practice either as to amount or t;ype." 3 
Merit and Length of Service. 
Another problem which faced the W.S.B. was to find a solution to the merit 
" and length of service increases. Individual increases in an industry m~y be 
based in single rate increases or a rate range increase whereby the employee 
can move in pay from a minimum to a maximum rate depending on merit and·length 
of service. Progression may be automatic, 6¢ an hour, each time a length of 
service period is completed until the max~mum amount is reached. Usually rate 
ranges and progression have little effect upon anyone except the employer and 
the employee concerned. However on the stabilization program, the rate ranges 
and progressive increases may be used as a device to secure an advantage over 
competitors using the single rate.1 Also in a tight labor market, it is sur-
prising how many employers find "meritorious" employees and then grant w~ge 
increases. The Board therefore had the problem of establishing some regu-
lations governing these rate ranges and progressions. The task was difficult 
as individual increases were very hard to police and control over them dep-
I 
ended entirely upon the cooperation of management and the unions. Further-
more controls over bonuses had to be flexible and not too tight if theywe~e 
to be workable. 2 
The Boards policies towards the merit, length of service increases ,and 
bonuses were set forth in G.W.R. 14.3 
2. National Industrial Conference Board Business Record p. 48. 
3· 16 F.R. p. 7328. 
1. B~kman op. cit. p.201. 
2. National Industrial Conference Board Business Record op. cit. p. 48-5,2. 
3· 16 F.R. p. 7509. 
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"This regulation permi ttea employers who have paid bonuses in accordance 
with established plan or otherwise to continue these plans without pri~r 
Board approval. The pa;yments must conform to the following standards!' 
1. The plan must be in continuous operation since January 25, 1949. 
2. Contained in collective bargaining agreement executed on or 
1
before 
January 25, 1951. ' · 
.3. Communicated in ivriting to the employees on or before January 25, 
~~. ' 
4. Method of computation of amounts ana percentages could not be 
changed from those used in 1950. 
1 5. Any increase which would amount to more than 25% of an employee' s 
salary must be submitted for the Board's approval. ' 
6. If no established plan existed, the bonuses paid to individuals may 
not exceed a bonus given for the same job in preceding year. 
Manpower 
I 
In a free labor market wages can be used as an incentive to hold o:r; to 
attract manpower to certain industries or to particular plants. It 'vas the 
policy of the Board not to grant increases in wages merely to permit an em-
~ ployer to hold or to attract more workers. The Board did make some exceptions 
to this general policy, but only in rare ana unusual cases. An example of 
I 
such unusual cases would be those involving industries located in an isolated 
area. In one case the Army furloughed draftee miners on the condition that 
they go back to the mines or to industries where the work -v1as relatively un-
pleasant. 
The obvious difficulty 1Yith this plan was that the Board 'tvas constantly 
faced 'Hi th the problem of where to draw the line bet-v1een the rare and ~usual 
cases and the standard usual wage cases. The Board had to be particularly 
careful in the administration of such a plan because too frequent resort to 
this type of justi£ication for wage increases could jeopardize the entire 
e stabilization program. 1 
The policy of the Board was expressed in G.W.R. 152which reads in p~t as 
follows: 
I 
4. Part 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 amounted to a freeze but Part 5 was a major loophple. 
1. Backman op. cit. p. 199 
2. 16 F .R. 7701 
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"The incentive wage rate system and piece rates are individual adjust-
ments intended to aid in the conversion and expansion of production· 
required by the defense effort. 
Some limitations of these adjustments were needed because the uncontrolled 
aggregate impact in piece and incentive rates could undermine the whole 
W.S.B. program. 11 
Substandard Wage Rates 
Special provisions had to be made to permit adjustments in all cases in 
which workers were receiving substandard wages. In 1938 the Fair Labdr Stan-
dards Act was passed establishing a minimum of 40 cents per hour, effective 
later; in 1945 this was raised to 50 cents per hour and in 1949 the le~el was 
raised to 75 cents per hour. Any rate below the minimum established by the 
F.L.S.A. would be considered a substandard wage by the Board. If the cost of 
I living rose during the mobilization period, the level of permissible wage ad-
1 
justments granted under regulations of the Board may exceed the minimum 
statutory wage established by the F.L.S.A. even though the wage rates were 
stabilized. 1 
There were many conflicts of opinion concerning whether the W.S.B. should 
deal in or become at all involved with substandard wages. One side of the 
controversy claimed that the ~.L.S.A. did not cover all industry which would 
be subject to stabilization and thus the ·u.S.B. could be used to permit\ .all 
wages to rise to the previously established federal legal minimum. A second 
argument •ras that the W.S.B. should raise the substandard •rages from the 
established legal minimum to Whatever higher rate which may be consisteht with 
the cost of living and thereby insure adequate compensation for all labor. 
Opposed to both these views was the argument that the wage stabilization pro-
gram should not be concerned with substandard wages because the purpose of 
the program w~s not to correct the inequities or distortions in the wage 
l. Backman op. cit. p. 199 
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structure or to disturb the existing wage differentials, but rathe~ tb esta-
blish a program of wage stabilization. It was further argued that the 
establishment of the minimum wage level is a problem for Congress and not the 
2 1-T.S.B. 
To set forth the policy of the Board on this question G.lv.R. 33 w·as 
issued which authorized wage increases to conform with the established mini-
mum vTage laivs and in part the regulation read as follows: 
' 
"The Board authorized increases in wages, salaries and other compensation 
to bring them into compliance with the F.L.S.A. of 1938 as amended or the 
Labor Management Relations Act of 194 7 or of' any state, D.C. or any 
Territory or Possession of the U.S." 
Intraplant Inequities 
Workers are more likely to be aware of intraplant inequities than inter-
plant inequities. It is generally accepted in our economy that the same kind 
and quantity of work within an establishment should receive the same pay. Job 
I 
analysis and job rating systems have been established in the different indus-
,, 
tries to obtain an objective and equitable relation between the various!' 
I 
occupations. The W.S.B. also had to relate job rates to ivages within a1 
community. The W.S.B. or the employer in bargaining with the union used the 
''anchor" system to eliminate the intraplant inequities. This system pl~ces 
an anchor or fixed wage rate on the lowest and the highest rated jobs in the 
plant and those positions Which were intermediate the fixed wage rates would 
be stabilized at wage rates between the maximum and minimum rated jobs. I 
To handle the intraplant inequities, the Board issued G.N.R. 18. A signifi-
cant amount of cases that were handled by W.S.B. involved the interpreta,tion 
of this regulation. The Board was faced with claims that wage differentials 
2. National Industrial Conference Board Business Record op. cit. p. 49. '1 
3. 16 F. R. p. 1015. 
1. Backman op. cit. p. 197. 
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between skilled and semi-skilled were either too large or too small; other 
claims required the Board to evolve a reclassification and simplification in 
the entire ivage structure as in the steel industry in World \-Tar II. 2 
The policy of the Board as set forth in G.W.R. 18 reads in part as 
follows: 
"Intra-plant inequities are a major source of industrial unrest and 
grievances. Sound programs to correct inequities can contribute td 
increased production and improved morale." 
Petitions of proposals to correct intra-plant inequities had to be sub-
mitted to W.S.B. The policy requires Board approval of proposals to correct 
intra-plant inequities whether accomplished through comprehensive job-rate 
I 
review or through individual job rate adjustments. The policy permitted the 
I 
correction of intra-plant inequities only when adjustments authorized 
under G.1f.R. 18 could not be used as a substitute for general wage rate 
increases. 
The General Wage Regulations I have revievred in this Chapter are marlifes-
tation of the economic policy developed by the W.S.B. from the general 
objectives set forth in the Defense Production Act of 1950 and in the sub-
sequent Executive Orders. The G.W.R. 's discussed herein are examples of the 
applied economic theory of the W.S.B. The Board by these regulations trans-
lated the general national objectives into the working national economic 
policy of the stabilization program. The effectiveness of these controls 
has been discussed in the previous chapter and so vdll not be reviewed ~ere. 
The specialized application of these regulations at the local level was 
appointed to the regional boards. One of these boards, the New England 'Vlage 
Stabilization Board, is discussed in the following chapter. Certain 
problems of interpretation will be discussed in Chapter V. 
2. 16. F.R. p. 12510 
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• 
V. Economic Analysis of Wage Stabilization in New England under the W.S.B. 
I 
A. Organization of the New England W.S.B. 
Under the authority of Title IV of the Defense Production Act of 1950 and 
pursuant to Executive Order 10161 and General Order 3 of the Economic Sta-
bilization Administrator, the Wage Stabilization Board began to administer 
the wage policy during the Korean Conflict. The regional structure of ,pre-
decessor agencies in the wage stabilization field had proven to be a success-
ful way to handle local problems quickly and efficiently and where necessary 
to mollify the seemingly harsh rules promulgated from Washington. With1 the 
background of factual and administrative information from the experience of 
the National War Labor Board1 and the National Wage Stabilization Board2 a 
regional board system similar to the structure of the N.W.S.B. was established. 
Thirteen W.S.B. Regional Offices were established throughout the continental 
United States to educate, assist and administer so that the stabilization pro-
gram under the D.P.A. of 19503 could be carried out effectively •. 
It is not the purpose of this section of the paper to discuss the 
Regional Offices in general but to consider one particular board --the NeF 
England Wage Stabilization Board. An analysis of the problems facing thb 
I 
region and some of the solutions which the Board proposed will be discussed 
in this chapter. First it is of interest to review some of the backgroUJ:.ld 
of this Regional Board. It was established under Mr. Harold Restein, who 
became director of administrative management on August 15, 1951. Dr. A. ,H. 
Meyer was appointed the fir.st chairman. This Regional Board inherited over I' 
three or four hundred pending cases from the Washington office. These cases 
vTere for various types of wage adjustments, hourly vTage rates, overtime, 
1. Terminated by Executive Order 9672 of December 31, 1945. 
2. Terminated by Executive Order 98o8 of December 12, 1946. 
3. Defense Production Act of 1950. 
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c 
shift differentials, fringe benefits, etc. In its tw·o years of operation 
about eight thousand cases were handled throughout the six New England states 
(from the largest to the smallest industries). The Board consisted of twelve 
regular members and six alternates. The enforcement commission consisted of 
three members. At its peak employment about one hundred persons were employed. 
The New England Board was terminated in February 1953 under the direction of 
Mr. Harold Restein and all important documents subsequently were shipped to 
Washington. After this date, some of the members of the Board remained ,and 
wrote a short history4 of their rewarding and fruitful experience.5 
B. Problems of the New· England W.S.B. and Their Solution • 
. 
Following is not a chronological report of the activities of the New 
England Board but merely a discussion of some of the highlights in the history 
of the New England• Board. These will shovr the nature of some of the problems 
which confronted the Board, and the solutions which the Board evolved. 
The regulation which seemed to give the most trouble both to the members 
' 
of the Board and to the employers was Regulation 9, Which governed wages in 
nevr plants. The criteria set forth in this regulation for determining and 
I 
evaluating a schedule of rates for new plants are in part: 
A. In the case of an already existing enterprise the new plants shall 
have the same wage rate as the lawful rates already established for 
the same or comparable jobs in the existing enterprise. 
B. In all other cases "'vhere there is not an existing enterprise, the new 
wage cannot exceed the rates in the same or comparable jobs: 
" 1) In the same industry in the same local labor market area or 2) in 
a comparable industry in the same local labor market area or 3) in 
the same industry located in the most nearly comparable labor market 
4. 11History of the Ne1v England Board," mimeographed,· n.p., n.d. 
1 5. Interview with Mr. Harold Restein·, Fargo Building, Boston, Mass., May 1954. 
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area. 6 
The New England Board in processing cases under this regulation found most 
--
of them to come under Section B of Regulation 9 (new plants where there is no 
existing enterprise). I In fact there are three types of situation which gave 
I 
the New England Board some difficulty in establishing -vrage rates. One 
typical situation is the case of an isolated plant in a labor market having no 
similar industry. This type can best be illustrated by the electronic~ cases 
from southern Connecticut (Stamford and New Haven). The staff had to use con-
siderable ingenuity in establishing these wage rates because the jobs involved 
were very difficult to compare with metal-working establishments predo~inant 
in the area. In the New Haven case of this particular type the Board hM to 
evaluate the job content of the petitioners' proposed occupations, rela~e 
them to the basic requirements as classified by the National Metal Trades 
Association in New Haven and then assign labor grades to them. 
The next type of situation ivas the case of "the isolated plant in t~e 
I' 
hinterland having virtually no industry." The General Electric plant iri. 
Limerick, Maine, was solved by the Board by using data from the nearest 
major labor market, Portland, which was 30 miles a-vray. In the case of 
Sylvan~a Electric Products, Waldoboro, Maine, the above procedure was in-
appropriate and the Board accepted the petitioner's o-vm comparison of his 
I 
proposed job rates on an evaluation basis with a few jobs picked up in the 
area. 7 
The third type involved a new plant established to produce an unusual 
product. Generally, a 11 special11 new plant case involved the difficulty q>f 
exceptionally high rates associated with a most unusual product. 
J 
6. National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., Revised Wage Stabilization: 
Manual, August 30, 1951, p. 9. 
7. History of New England Board p.4. 
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In the case of the Tower Iron Works, the petitioner proved that he wa~ in the 
air frame business so the Board permitted wage payments similar to those in 
effect at the Avco Manufacturing Company in Bridgeport, Conn. , approximately 
100 miles from North Dighton, Mass., where the new plant was opened. In the 
Norden case, the Board had to modify the exceptionally high wage rates pro-
posed by the petitioner. Another case of this type was the Kollmorge~ 
Optical Company, a submarine periscope manufacturer. The New England Board 
approve~ for draftsmen the highest rates which data from Western Massa-
chusetts would allow and forwarded the petition to Washington 11wi th sympathy11 
and urged that the case be considered on a manpower basis. Washington1 
approved. 8 
Fringe benefits in the case of new plants did not present too much diffi-
culty because they were able to be related either to industry practice within 
the area or to general area practice. 9 
The next regulation which the Boston office found required special appli-
cation was the tandem wage increases--Regulation 10. Petitions for wage 
adjustments under this regulation had to contain: 
1) Proof of a tandem relationship in the past five years; 
2) An explanation of the circumstances which disrupted this relationship; 
I, 
3) Any other pertinent information which the petitioner thought impor-
tant. 
10 
The National Board's action affected the action of the Regional Bo8Vds more 
frequently under this regulation than any other. Steel, brass, textiles, 
electrical and rubber decisions in Washington had a direct impact on similar 
8. History of New England Board p.3 
9. History of the New England Board, pp. 3-4. · 
10. National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., Revised Wage Stabilization 
Manual, p. 171 
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cases processed by the Regional Boards. The National Steel decision, which 
affected many workers in Worcester, Mass., gave the staff and the Board of 
the New England Region a chance to evaluate the impact of the Washington 
decision upon the Neiv England Region. 11 The staff estimated the impact as 
about six cents per hour in the metal -vrorking industry in the Worcester labor 
market area. The device used vras to compute the percentage relationship of 
workers affected by the steel increase to the total population used by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics job rates. Then this percentage was multiP,lied by 
I 
sixteen cents. The product was added across the Board to the Bureau o~ Labor 
Statistics job rates. 
Intra-plant tandem petitions were processed with less difficulty. The 
staff in presenting the case for first consideration gave the Board a 1· 
detailed job-rate comparison information. This approach enabled the Board to 
authorize approvals of the petitions at one sitting and thereby minimize 
reconsiderations. 12 
Fringe benefits w·ere regulated under Regulation 13. These includeq. paid 
vacations, paid holidays, premium pay relative to days and hours of work, 
I 
shift differentials, call-in pay, etc. These benefits could not exceed pre-
vailing industry or area practice either as to amount or type. 
13 
I The Neiv England Board's first duty was to develop standards for wage ad-
justments, as the first case handled by this Region was one involving fringe 
I benefits. A committee was appointed to formulate and recommend criteria for 
approval of fringe adjustments. The committee adopted the following cr~teria 
as a standard of comparison: 
11. 11Histopy of the New England Board, 11 p. 4. 
12. "History of the New England Board," pp. 4-5. 
13. National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., Revised Wage Stabilization 
Manual, p. 221. 
"(1) A substantially unifqrm practice followed by a number of establish-
ments in the same industry in the particular local area or; (2) a 
substantially uniform practice followed by a number of establishments in 
the same industry in the 1st Region or; (3) the prevailing practiee in 
varied related industries within the particular local area or; (4) the 
prevailing practice in varied related industries within the 1st Region.14 
"The standard of area practice l'lill be used normally, but the standard of 
industry practice in the region may be used Where it will be a~propriate 
for the preservation of historical and traditional patterns. rrl5 
The Board applied the 50% ruling (50% of plants or 50% of the employees in 
a reasonably defined area) to the above framework. Later the New Engl!'and 
Board took two additional steps by setting up "area floors" with the use of 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics data. These data were classified: 
1) Manufacturing; 
2) Wholesale trade; 
3) Retail trade_; 
4) Public utilities, transportation and communications; 
5) Service industries.16 
Any petitioner within one of these groupings might with Board approvali 
liberalize a Regulation 13 fringe up to the level prevailing in the broad 
B.L.S. grouping or up to the level prevailing in his particular industry 
grouping, whichever was higher. 
Also the Board later dropped the 50% ruling to 4o% of the firms or 
I 
employees where the plant was located--in Boston, Bridgeport, or Portl~d. 
In spite of these rather flexible approaches, the Board still found[ many 
I 
problems facing it when analyzing cases under this regulation. Diffic1il..ties 
of data, absence of any clear-cut historical and traditional patterns, and 
the pressure of the parties made it clear to the members of the Board that 




the earlier criteria they had set up had only limited validity when applied 
to actual cases. 
A case involving difficulties of data was the Southvrorth Machine Company 
in Portland, Maine. At the time the most recent Bureau of Labor Stat~stics 
Survey had been in March 1949 ~d would have allowed only six paid ho~idalfs. 
The staff, however, obtained data from eight companies through union officials, 
telephone calls to firms, and through some assistance from the B.L.S. ~~ion 
contract file. vTith this data the Board approved eight paid holidays I'or 
metalvTorkers in Portland. 
The printing industry vTas an example of lack of clear -cut historical and 
•' 
traditional patterns. In the fringe petitions the Board found it impossible 
to use the industry within-area approach, except in major labor market areas. 
The parties sometimes offered information covering all New England. ~e 
Board's solution was to compare the proposal with the ~ractice prevailing in 
towns of comparable size in the same state, or in the case of nevTspapers, with 
newspapers of comparable circulation. 
In some instances the Board had to svTit.ch standards as it became clear 
·' that earlier determinations had only limited validity. The Boai:d started 
v~th industry-within-area approach, but quickly switched to a strict industry-
within~region approach which it applied to all paper manufacturing oper,ations 
regardless of product. The reason for this move was the fact that the 
"industry" is replete with multi-product companies. Great Northern, st:.croix, 
I 
and Pejebscot cases are examples of this "switching standards" of the New 
England Board. 17 
Fringe questions such as funeral leaves, military leave pay and payment of 
work clothes did not cause any major conflict. Early in 1952 before the 
I 
17. Ibid. pp. 9-10. 
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revision of Regulation 13 which directed handling of certain "fringy fringes," 
the Regional Board took the initiative and gave the staff authority to process 
1 
Ydthout regard to industry area standards such items as payment for work 
clothes, funeral leaves, etc. 
The reason for this YTaS that Regional Board operations would be facilitated 
by freeing such minor cost items from the necessity of applying the industry 
in area standards. 
Also the proposal to liberalize fringe benefits "in lieu of" wage in-
creases was not a major problem to the Regional Board. 18 
To get a complete picture of the activities of the New England Board, two 
additional regulations will be considered--Regulation 14, which is conterned 
I 
irlth bonuses, and Regulation 17, which is concerned with inter-plant inequity. 
Regulation 14 applies to bonuses which may be put into effect without prior 
I 
I 
specific board approval. Bonus payments according to an established plan 
have certain standards to qualify, such as: 
(1) The plan m~st have been in continuous operation since January 1949 
or; (2) contained in a written collective bargaining unit or given 1in a 
written statement to employees since January 1951. (3) .Also the p~an 
used in 1950 must not be changed. 
Bonuses not according to an established plan also have certain standards 
to qualify~ such as: 
1) The per cent of employees receiving bonuses in the current year should 
not exceed the per cent receiving bonuses in the preceding year; I 
> 19 2) The bonus should not exceed more than 25% of an employee's wages. 
Before vTage stabilization came into effect it was the practice of com-
panies to pay bonuses in excess of 25%. The New England Board approved 
18. Ibid., pp. 10-12. 
19. National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., Revised Wage Stabilization 
Manual, p. 231. 
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discretionary bonuses which did not exceed 25% of wages. T.he Regional Board 
I 
also frequently waived the limitations on bonuses distributed to individuals 
if they were not designed to give unlaWful vrage increases to a select group 
or a favored individual. T.he New· England Board also allowed a change in the 
1951 base period if, because of depressed sales or other hardship, the bonus 
I 
practice in this particular industry was decreased or even eliminated. And 
I 
the Board also approved of a bonus which did not exceed an average paid in 
any three years between 1946 and 1950. In one or two hardship cases where 
the company granted bonuses in only two of the five years, the Board permitted 
averaging over the two-year per~od as in the B. Jahn case. 20 
In neiv plants the bonus rates must not exceed the rates paid in plants in 
the industry or area. In the case of a bonus to an individual the policy of 
the Board was to stretch a point and grant the bonus if it could be deter-
mined that the individual in question had assumed responsibilities or duties. 
In dealing vTi th this regulation, the Board found that the rigid restric-
tions on bonuses created gross inequities in many ca~es, but the Regio~al 
Board was unable to correct them because of lack of authority. 
I 
A company which was in poor financial condition might be willing td grant 
the employees a bonus which would not be incorporated into the permanerit wage 
structure of the company. Also there were many cases of individuals vrho had 
assumed additional responsibilities or contributed to the firm's volume or 
profits. T.he New England Board felt that the National Board should graht 
I 
special year -end bonuses in accordance vTi th the time the individuals were 
engaged in the extra work. 21 
Regulation 17 is concerned vTith problems of inter-plant inequities. T.he 
20. "History of New EnglanQ. Board. "p. 13. 
21. "History of the New England Board, 11 pp. 12-14. 
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process for regulating these inequities is defined by the regulation as 
follows: 
11Determine the appropriate group of establishments ••• This shall be the 
one which is best adapted to preserve normal patterns of wage sett'ing ••• 
The rates for job classification involved in the petition are then. to be 
compared with rates for comparable job classification in the comparison 
group.u22 
The Board found that this regulation called for a great deal of judgment 
on the part of the Board members--for example, nwhere is the industry with 
which the rate of comparison should be made? 11 In the Standard Industrial 
I 
Classification code book published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics there 
I 
are many groups and sub-groups and sub-sub-groups and it is obvious that the 
petitioner vnll compare his rate with the group which will best support his 
cause. 
Another qU;estion which could be asked is, 11'\iJhat is the appropriate labor 
market area? 11 This comparison could be made with the entire region or vnth 
two other plants in the same town. Another question which caused concern 
I WaS' 111-l.hat iS the I jOb I ? II The problem of lining up the jobs of a petitioning 
employer with the job title of a survey caused quite a problem for the,Board 
members. 11What is the prevailing rate?" In most cases the arithmetic 'mean 
was acceptable but of course there were cases where variations occurre~. The 
concept of 11predominant wage" was used in the case where thirteen unionized 
Boston milk companies sought an increase on the basis of the rate used by 
Hood's Milk Company, the largest single producer and a non-union conce~n. In 
25 this case the Board used the Hood rate instead of the B.L.S. average. 
The Board found that several companies had a practice of keying their 
rates to the averages for a selected list of high wage concerns in their 
22. Regulation 17, mimeographed, not published, no date. 
23. "History of the New England Board," pp. 14-20. 
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locality. These plants receive periodic reports on w·ages from these concerns 
and adjusted their own wage levels accordingly. These companies had a 
practice of keeping in at the head of the wage procession. Under stab'ili-
,, 
zation it seemed impractical to allow this policy to continue or otherl 
companies would petition for wage increases on the same basis. Accord~ngly, 
in the Procter and Gamble case the Board rejected the petition on the grounds 
I 
that the companies' policies would be disrupted. However, the Board felt 
that the rates could be approved on the grounds that they were in effect in 
, 
the plant of the petitioner~ only competitor in this region, Lever Brothers.24 
The Board Standards Division was established in the national effie~ for· 
the purpose of appraising regional operations and keeping the regions informed 
as to the development of new or changed policy and answering policy and case-
processing inquiries from the regions. The appraisal function was never fully 
accomplished because when the regional offices were established in 195i, there 
was a tremendous backlog of cases. This, together with the limited budget 
and staff, required that first emphasis be on the processing of cases. No ap-
parent intere~t was shown in the Board Standards Division and since it was 
. ', 
under-staffed and given no direction from Washington little progress was made. 
Early in the spring of 1952, the functions of the Standards Division were 
transferred to the Office of Case Analysis. The reason for this was the 
persons familiar with case problems and processing could handle the work more 
efficiently and promptly. A program for appraisal of regional operations was 
established. It called for examination of the minutes of each of the regular 
·~ boards, screening of sample cases that the board had acted on, and regq.lar 
visits to the regional offices by top staff of the Office of Case Ana~ysis. 25 
24. "History of the Nevr England Board," p. 20. 
25. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, April, 1954, p. 320. 
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Unfortunately this program of appraising regional functions was never 
carried out and the regular trips were never taken. The program was J 
I, 
failure because of the lack of interest on the part of the National Bd~d. 
The National Board assumed the attitude that if the regions or petitioners 
did not complain "all was well," even though this could have been an indi-
cation of a loose interpretation of Board policies. 26 
The New England Board felt that Washington should consult the regions 
before formulating new· policies Which -vrould affect the entire country 
because there was a danger that Washington's point of view 'i·rould not re-
present the composite thinking of all the regional boards. The contacts 
between Washington and the regions were all too few. 27 
The New England Board strenuously complained about the complete in-
difference of Washington. 28 Washington never seemed to be able to furnish 
promptly and in sufficient quantity the documents needed to do the war~. 
Regulations, resolutions, interpretations, etc. would reach the Board ~ week 
or two after they had appeared in the unofficial publications of the BUreau 
of National Affairs. In connection with these problems it appeared to be a 
standard joke with the New England Board that the l'Tashington teletype 
machines fed directly into their wastebaskets. Another complaint from the 
I 
New England Board was that Washington should have furnished from the outset 
a comprehensive index of all Board materials, and supplemented it each week 
or as frequently as it seemed necessary to keep the material up to date. Also 
I 
one last complaint of the Region was that a comprehensive system of numbering 
and lettering should have been worked out. 29 
26. Ibid., p. 330. 
27. Interview with Mr. Harold Restein. 
28. Ibid. 
29. 11History of the New England 'Board," pp. 21-25. 
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The New England Board felt that Washington upheld about three-quar.ters of 
its decisions. (This is not based on actual statistics but upon minutes of 
,I 
the Review and Appeals Committee.) This low reversal rate of the New England 
Board apparently means that Region I was able to keep its thinking in line 
with the national policy. However, it could mean that the National Board 
was unduly lax and, therefore, there were fevr appeals which Washington found 
it necessary to reverse. The New England Board prefers to think the fbrmer 
was the case. In a good many cases vThere the Board held fast to its e~lier 
decision and forwarded the appeal to Washington it knew the case decision 
would be reversed. Also in the cases where Washington reversed the decision 
of the Regional Board, the members of the Region felt that perhaps Washington 
30 had not understood the facts and the reasoning of the Regional Office. The 
New England Board felt that its members had learned a great deal about policy 
matters and problems of wage stabilization and also that it would be al,1mis-
take to let their experience·go into the past without some account of it. 
Therefore, many of the Board and staff members stayed on after th~ official 
termination date and wrote a short history of the New England Board. In 
writing this history the members of the Board,based upon their experience, 
agreed on two administrative principles which were paramount to all others. 
If these principles were followed, the operation of the regional board~ would 
have been more efficient and effective. The principles are as follows~ 
1) .Any effort by governments to interfere w'ith the free play of cqm-
petition in the labor market is certain to be a very complicated 
business and an irritant to everyone concerned. By the very nature of 
the problem, precise rules and clear-cut decisions based on accepted 
. 
facts are likely to be all too scarce. It is, therefore, highly 




desirable to strive for maximum precision and clarity at the following 
points: 
a) In defining the over-all objectives of the program and keeping the 
regions informed of any changes in those objectives. 
b) In drafting the rules and regulations and stating in advanc~ the 
criteria for decisions when judgment must play a large part. 
c) At the level of the regional board, in making every reasonable 
effort to relate the decision of each individual case to a larger, even 
I 
though evolving pattern. 
2) Top management, both in Washington and the regions, need to pay more 
attention to good administration. The regional offices do not know the 
Washington situation in detail, but in their region the pressure to get 
out cases, to work on cases, to deal with petitioners, made it difficult 
to get the time needed to handle administrative matters, and to d~vise 
better methods of coping with their problems. A little more time devoted 
to such considerations would have improved the quality and quantity of 
their work. 31 
0. Conclusion. 
The New England W.S.B., in spite of the many difficult problems that 
seemed to hinder its operations at times, did an adequate and consci~ntious 
job in attempting to stabilize wages and prices. 32 The New England W.S.B. 
profited from the difficulties of the stabilization program and accordingly 
enriched our economic experience and first-hand knowledge. Such personnel as 
~ contributed to the past stabilization program should not be shelved and for-
gotten but rather kept available and informed in case of another Korea. 
31. Interview with Mr. Harold Restein, Nevr England Regional Office, May 1954. 
32. See reference to electronics case and Tow·er Iron Works, supra, pp. 4.6,47. 
-60-
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. The first effort at wage stabilization by the Federal Government was 
during World War II. 
2. During World War II wage controls were not established until about 
ten months after the outbreak of war and during this interim period the wage 
I 
and price levels were moderately successfully maintained by a policy of 
voluntary restraint. 
3. The economy of the nation was much different in the spring of 1950 
than in the winter of 1941; the presence of high production, high con~umer 
I 
demand and a tight labor market distinguished the pre-Korea period from the 
pre-World War II period. 
4. After the Korean Conflict began the initial request for a staqiliza-
tion program was made by the President in his message to Congress on July 19, 
1950 and in his 1950 mid-year Economic Report, but it was not until S~ptem-
ber 8, 1950 that legislation authorizing the President to stabilize wages 
was enacted and it was not until January 26, 1951 that a directive fr~ezing 
wages and prices and initiating an active stabilization program was i~sued. 
5. The Defense Production Act of 1950 passed by Congress in answer to 
the President's request was an integrated piece of legislation incorporating 
the different aspects of production and stabilization and providing the 
President with broad authority to combat the threat of inflation. 
6. During the early part of the Korean Conflict the President rexied 
upon voluntary restraint not to increase or demand an increase of wages and 
this effort on the part of the President differed little from the hold-the-
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line policy of World War II. 
7. Wage and price levels increased rapidly in the summer and fall of 
1950 following the outbreak of the Korean Conflict even in the face of the 
r 
appeal by ·the President to hold the line. 
8. The President on September 9, 1950 under the authority of the Defense 
Production Act of 1950 created the Wage Stabilization Board, a tripartite 
I 
group consisting of nine members with limited authority in planning and 
developing wage stabilization policies. 
9. Wages were frozen on January 26, 1951 under a general price-wage 
"freeze" is~ued by the Government, which was the first act in an active 
I' 
attempt to control wages and prices following the outbreak of the Korean Con-
flict·. 
10. Following the freeze of January 26, 1951 the W.S.B. issued a series 
of regulations attempting to "thaw out" the "freeze'', but labor's dissatis-
1 
faction with one of the regulations, Gl~-6, was so deep that when the 
regulation was issued on a formula different from the one proposed by the 
labor members, the labor members on February 16, 1951 walked off the Board, 
I • 
thereby immobilizing the W.S.B. 
11. Under an April 21, 1951 order of the President the W.S.B. was recon-
stituted to an 18-man tripartite Board with authority to settle certain 
disputes and organized more directly under the eye of the President. 
12. Further wage regulations were issued by the W.S.B. establishing 
general criteria for wage adjustments but the Board refused to set fo~th a 
formula for wage increases such as the Little Steel Formula of World Var II. 
13. The W.S.B. established thirteen regional offices throughout the 
nation, each having exclusive original jurisdiction in its respective region 
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over matters under the authority of the W.S.B. 
14. The New England office of the W.S.B. was organized on August 15, 1951 
and the administration of the regulations was conducted through a Regional 
Boara consisting of twelve regular members and six alternates, whose function 
I 
was to review and act upon all cases wi thi.n the New England Region. 
15. The W.S.B. affirmed about three-quarters of the cases appealed from 
the New England Regional Board. 
Congress and the Executive profited and were influenced by the difficul-
ties and success of the stabilization program of World War II. The resulting 
legislation passed in September, 1950 to control the economy showed evidence 
of this experience, for the Defense Production Act of 1950 was a more artful 
piece of work than the piecemeal program of control of wages and prices which 
identified the programs of World War II. 
The tight labor market, high production, and the President's request for 
both increased production and a stabilized economy during the emergency period 
I 
demanded that a program be initiated which incorporated the flexible adjust-
ment policy of stabilization. The D.P.A. of 1950 incorporates this policy of 
stabilization and provided the Executive with broad powers to administer the 
program effectively. The policy toward voluntary ]?rice and wage control set 
forth in the act was no doubt the result of a backward glance at the success 
of the "hold-the-line11 policy effectively administered during the early days 
of World War II. Politically this policy had many advantages but the reluc-
tance of the President to establish some Federal control of wages and prices 
during the fall and winter of 1950 was a tragic economic error. The ~conomy 
of the nation was drastically different in 1950 thah it was in 1942; and it 
is difficult to understand the reluctance of the President to establish early 
-63-
governmental control. .Af'ter the controls were initiated the wage stabiliza-
tion program made the Government an interested party in every wage increase 
and while the spirit of the act echoed the reliance on collective bargaining 
as the primary means to determine a wage level, the Government nevertheless 
I, 
established the rules of play. Collective bargaining was impaired and perhaps 
in some cases reduced to a mere formal requirement before the appeal ~o the 
Board. The difficulties encountered by the Board in approving wage increases 
I 
and enforcing the general wage regulations made clear that no over-all formula 
" 
for a wage rise, such as the Little Steel Formula df World War II, could be 
effectively administered. The use of the general wage regulation and
1 
an 
appeal to the Board to ameliorate the effect of the regulations in the excep-
tional cases seems the most effective procedure. The delays and formal 
requirements which had to be met before a hearing by the 1-T.S.B. had ib. them-
selves a salutary effect because the issues of disagreement had to be,, clearly 
stated and understood by each side, and during the delay there arose an 
opportunity for compromise between the parties. 
Labor's concern for high-level recognition and an administrative body 
which is possessed of a certain minimum quantity of power should not be over-
looked. The W.S.B. should have been created more independent of the E.S.A. 
and O.D.M. and more directly under the President, though closely coop~rating 
1nth and carrying out the policies of the Stabilization and Mobilizat~on 
agencies. The dislike of a Board whose £unction is to affect wages s~ould 
not be lost in an organizational labyrinth and such a Board to have p;restige 
- should have certain povrers to settle wage disputes. There will of coilrse be 
conflicts vri th other labor boards because of the conflict arising out of the 
restraint upon collective bargaining, but in times of emergency the qhestion 
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of paramount interest is an easy one. 
The short-time operation of the New England Regional Board reduce'd its 
-
effectiveness but the primary difficulty seems resolved to an admin~~trative 
problem. If greater authority were delegated to the regional boards .and 
appeals to the vT. S .B. were made only in exceptional cases the work o:¢, the 
regional boards would ease the strain on the National Board and more effec-
tively resolve the local problems. In order to assure uniformity in ~he 
administration of policies, this researcher proposes that each member. of the 
National Board be assigned as chief stabilization official in one region with 
power to certify any case to the National Board for review. The regfonal 
boards by this procedure would not be enslaved to procedural minutiae promul-
gated by the National Board because each board would be free to regulate 
within a general grant of authority by the National Board with overa!l super-
vision by the chief stabilization official. This would result in a more 
effective stabilization program, leaving to the National Board the br.oad 
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ABSTRACT 
I. History and Basis of Wage Stabilization 
The first effort in the history of this nation to establish a compre-
hensive wage control program vTas taken during World War II. It was not, 
I 
I 
however, until several months after the outbreak of hostilities that ~he 
President saw fit to ask Congress for special powers to permit him to initiate 
I 
a wage control program. During the interim, wages were maintained at' a stable 
level by the appeal of the President to labor and management to hold the line. 
Authority to begin the program of wage and price control was given the 
I 
President in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and subsequentl~:the 
National War Labor Board was established. The wage control function during 
World lfar II was handled by several administrative groups and finally1 was 
vested in the National Wage Stabilization Board, whose function concerned the 
stabilization of wages and salaries and the settlement of certain labor dis-
putes. The war in the Pacific ended with the N.W.S.B. functioning as the 
single wage stabilization agency. Following a brief transition period all 
such functions were either terminated or vested in the Secretary of Labor, 
and the N.W.S.B. was dissolved. 
During the years following the termination of World War II the economy 
of the ·nation took on renewed strength. The increase in economic activity 
meant high employment and prosperity which brought a higher standard of living 
4l to all. In the spring of 1950 when the nation was experiencing another year 
of prosperity a Communist aggression in Korea reminded this countr~ of its 
role in international affairs and involved us in a shooting war. The nation 
was faced with a grim task. Material for war must be produced and yet in so 
-1-
doing our economic stability must not be sacrificed. The President ip his 
1950 Midyear Economic Report asked for special powers to increase the produc-
tive capacity of the nation and to maintain a stabilized economy. Dtiring the 
summer of 1950 Congress considered, debated and passed the Defense ~oduction 
Act of 1950. Under the authority of this act the President establisHed the 
Wage Stabilization Board, a tripartite administrative group consisting of 
nine members whose duty was to make recommendations to the Economic Stabiliza-
tion Administrator regarding the planning and development of wage stabilization 
policies. 
II. Administration of the 1-Tage Stabilization Program During the Kore!:m Conflict 
The President established the W.S.B. by Executive Order on September 9, 
1950 but placed immediate primary reliance upon voluntary action by b~th labor 
and industry to hold the line. Wages and prices nevertheless continued to rise 
and it was not until January 26, 1951 that a general price 11freeze" ivas placed 
on prices and wages. :Because of the delay by Congress during the summer and 
by the President after the authority was given to him, and because some indus-
try and labor members refused to follow the President's call to hold the line, 
the wage-price structure of the economy was seriously entangled. The W.S.B. 
made a genuine effort during the weeks following the "freeze" to work out a 
formula to adjust the wages of those workers who had not received an ~ncrease 
during the past welve months. The conflict between the labor and the other 
' 
members of the Board was too great, and when aii adjustment formula was 
adopted in mid-February 1951 by the industry and public members, labor refused 
to join and thereupon walked off the Board. This act of the labor members 
innnobilized the Board during the important weeks following the "freeze." The 
Board was reconstituted on April 21, 1951 but certain important changes in the 
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structure of the Board, favorable to labor, were made. The new W.S.B. was 
composed of eighteen members, tripartite in representation, and was ~mpowered 
to handle certain disputes independent of the E.S.A. and O.D.M. Following 
I 
the reconstitution both labor and industry cooperated in an effective admini-
i 
stration of the wage stabilization program. 
Primary reliance was placed upon collective bargaining as a means:to arrive 
at a reasonable wage rate, but under the regulations of the W.S.B. i~ became 
clear that the Government was an interested party in every wage dispute. The 
policy set forth by the Board was that the regulations would not prohibit the 
gradual improvement of real wages but any wage rise should not go beyond the 
limits of stabilization as determined by the Board. Collective bargaining 
, was indeed limited by the regulations of .. the W.S.B. but in theory neither 
labor or industry could complain because in a time of emergency the economic 
security of the nation is paramount. 
III. Economic Analysis of the Wage Stabilization Program 
An acceptable vrage stabilization policy should include a control measure 
I 
to hold down runaway inflation, a protective measure to maintain labor's real 
wage, and a measure which can be continued during the post-emergency period 
and assist in the economic transition to a full civilian economy. 
The Korean emergency required that the productive capacity of the nation 
supply the requirements for war and, to a limited degree, supply the require-
ments for a civilian economy. Therefore the stabilization program was 
necessary to counteract the very real danger of a serious runaway period of 
inflation. In the spring of 1950 there existed a tight labor market and an 
,, 
already high demand for civilian goods; thus vTith the additional de!Jland for 
war material the stabilization program had not only to stabilize but ~o create 
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some incentive for an increase in production. 
Of the three different theoretical wage control systems--a stric~ hold-
the-line, a flexible adjustment, a mixed flexible adjustment and holdl~the-
line--the flexible adjustment system of control was best suited to ~· economy 
such as existed in the summer of 1950. It was vTi th these economic factors in 
mind that Congress in the summer of 1950 enacted the Defense Productipn Act, a 
program incorporating the flexible adjustment policy of stabilization,. 
IV. Wage Policies and Orders of the National Wage Stabilization Board 
The general objectives of the stabilization program were develope~ into 
concrete economic principles by the W.S.B. and were issued to industry, labor 
and the public as General Wage Regulations (G. W.R. 1 s). Certain G. W.R.~ 1 s have 
been reviewed in order to analyze the effectiveness of the stabilization pro-
1 
gram. These regulations set forth in specific terms the rules governing cost-
of-living adjustments (G.W.R.8), fringe benefits (G.WR.l3), substand~d wage 
I 
rates (G. W.R. 3), bonuses (G. W.R. 13), manpower (G. W.R. 15), interplant in-
equities (G.W.R. 17) and intraplant inequities (G.W.R. 18). Each of these 
regulations established an economic frame-v1ork in which industry and labor 
could conduct themselves and conform to the objectives of the stabili~ation 
program. 
V. Economic Analysis of Wage Stabilization in New England Under the W.S.B. 
Pursuant to authority granted to the lf.S.B., thirteen regional offices 
were established to administer effectively the regulations of the Board. The 
" 
local board could better evaluate the important cases and make recommendations 
to the vi.S.B. in respect to the local issues. Furthermore the local ~oards 
I 
could inte~pret for the local labor and industry representatives the 
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regulations of the W.S.B. 
In the New England area the regional board was frequently called upon to 
interpret and apply G.W.R. 9 which governed wages in new plants and because of 
the influx of diverse industry into New England this gave the region~ board 
difficult albeit interesting problems. The regional board's effectiveness 
was seriously reduced because of administrative confusion and because delay 
occurred in the handling of the opinions by the W.S.B. It was not infrequent 
that policies evolved by the W.S.B. would be wholly inapplicable to fact 
situations in New England, which would not have been the case had the 1 New 
I 
England Board been asked for counsel beforehand. 
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